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The Committee for Economic Develop-
ment is an independent research and policy
organization of some 250 business leaders
and educators. CED is nonprofit, nonparti-
san, and nonpolitical. Its purpose is to pro-
pose policies that bring about steady eco-
nomic growth at high employment and
reasonably stable prices, increased productiv-
ity and living standards, greater and more
equal opportunity for every citizen, and an
improved quality of life for all.
All CED policy recommendations must
have the approval of trustees on the Research
and Policy Committee. This committee is di-
rected under the bylaws, which emphasize
that “all research is to be thoroughly objec-
tive in character, and the approach in each
instance is to be from the standpoint of the
general welfare and not from that of any
special political or economic group.” The
committee is aided by a Research Advisory
Board of leading social scientists and by a
small permanent professional staff.
The Research and Policy Committee does
not attempt to pass judgment on any pend-
ing specific legislative proposals; its purpose is
to urge careful consideration of the objectives
set forth in this statement and of the best means
of accomplishing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive
discussions, meetings, and exchange of memo-
randa. The research is undertaken by a sub-
committee, assisted by advisors chosen for their
competence in the field under study.
The full Research and Policy Committee
participates in the drafting of recommenda-
tions. Likewise, the trustees on the drafting
subcommittee vote to approve or disapprove a
policy statement, and they share with the
Research and Policy Committee the privilege
of submitting individual comments for publi-
cation.
The recommendations presented herein are
those of the trustee members of the Research and
Policy Committee and the responsible subcom-
mittee. They are not necessarily endorsed by other
trustees or by non-trustee subcommittee members,
advisors, contributors, staff members, or others
associated with CED.
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PURPOSE OF THIS STATEMENT
This assessment of U.S. immigration policy
and practice draws on CED’s long history of
research in the areas of education, worker train-
ing, economic growth, and labor market policy
reform. In prior policy statements such as
American Workers and Economic Change (1996),
Putting Learning First: Governing and Managing
the Schools for High Achievement (1994), and New
Opportunities for Older Workers (1999), CED has
emphasized the need for improved education
and training of the U.S. workforce. In America’s
Basic Research: Prosperity Through Discovery (1998),
we highlighted the challenges of a global mar-
ket for highly trained graduates in science and
engineering. And in Fixing Social Security (1997),
we described the approaching demographic
dilemma, when increasing numbers of retirees
will have to be supported by fewer active work-
ers.
Immigration issues intersect with each of
these policy areas to which CED has addressed
its work. In this statement we explore the role
that immigration should play in the develop-
ment of our future workforce and in the con-
tinued economic growth and prosperity of our
society. We note both the benefits and costs of
immigration, examine the current state of im-
migration policy and administration, and ar-
gue that a comprehensive reform of both policy
and administration is required to realize
immigration’s large potential benefits. We of-
fer a set of recommendations that we believe
provides a framework for discussion and ac-
tion in this important area.
We recognize that immigration is a large,
complex, and controversial subject. In this re-
port, we have chosen to focus on the area of
CED’s greatest competence and interest—the
relationship of immigration to the workforce
and thereby to economic growth and living
standards. We acknowledge there are large
and important immigration issues that we have
not addressed, most notably the social and
cultural effects of immigration and the eco-
nomic and social conditions confronting these
“new Americans.” These issues present major
problems and opportunities regarding their
assimilation into our economy and society. This
statement is also principally about legal immi-
gration, although we touch on the problem of
unauthorized workers insofar as it is an inex-
tricable part of the workforce issues addressed
here. Our report is therefore limited in scope,
but we believe it provides useful analysis and
sound policy recommendations regarding im-
migration and the workforce.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Immigration is a dynamic force in our soci-
ety and economy. For decades, immigration
has helped fuel America’s entrepreneurial
spirit. However, immigration policy has long
been a battleground of competing interests,
and its administration has been woefully
ineffective.
Our current immigration policy does not
adequately address our economic future, and
its administration is marked by inefficiency,
delay, and frustration. The policy fails to meet
the demands of a global marketplace that re-
wards mobility and skills. CED recognizes that
increases in immigration are no panacea for
the problems of an aging population and can-
not replace basic education and training as
the source of a skilled workforce. But an effi-
cient and flexible immigration system can help
us confront the economic challenges ahead.
FINDINGS
• The markets for skilled labor have been
very tight in recent years, and the demand
for skilled workers will grow rapidly. Due
to an extraordinarily robust economy and a
rising demand for skills, employers in many
industries have faced worker shortages. The
relative wages of skilled workers have risen
rapidly, and occupations that require at least
an associate’s degree are projected to grow
twice as fast as total employment during
1998-2008. [p. 4]
• Today’s admission system places too little
emphasis on meeting the nation’s present
and future needs for skilled workers. The
current system fulfills our commitment to
family and humanitarian principles, but
about 80 percent of legal immigrants face
no skill requirements. [pp. 7, 18]
• Highly skilled immigrants provide important
benefits to the U.S. economy. The overall
net economic benefit to the United States
from immigration is positive but small, but
high-skill immigrants produce disproportion-
ately large benefits. Low-skill immigrants con-
tribute economically, but also depress the
wages of poor, low-skill native workers and
place a significant fiscal burden on some
state and local governments. [p.12]
• Illegal migration presents serious economic
and social problems. Unauthorized workers
make major economic contributions in agri-
culture, services, and other sectors. But they
typically have little education, and they and
their children face formidable difficulties in
assimilating to American society. [pp. 13,
28]
• Backlogs and delays in admitting foreign
workers reveal failures in immigration ad-
ministration and management. The full pro-
cess of approval for a foreign permanent
worker now takes two to ten years, and as
much as half the annual allotment of such
visas is unused due to such delays. There is a
backlog of over one million total “green card”
applicants attempting to adjust to perma-
nent status. Workers, employers, and the
economy suffer from the uncertainty and
delay caused by these bottlenecks. [pp. 20,
24]
• Failures in the administration of the perma-
nent visa system have distorted and burdened
the temporary visa system. The H-1B tempo-
rary specialty worker visa has now become
the backdoor entry for permanent admis-
sion. Rapid increases in the H-1B admission
ceilings, while alleviating immediate hiring
problems, will place intolerable strains on
the system in the future. [p. 21]
xMAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS
CED recommends an integrated approach
to the reform of immigration policy and ad-
ministration that places greater emphasis on
labor market skills. The recommended actions
would increase the efficiency and flexibility of
the system, while preserving America’s dedica-
tion to family reunification and humanitarian
admissions. We address five general themes:
(1) Broaden the Skill Base [p. 30]
• Double the current 140,000 limit on skill-
based, permanent employment visas.
• Do not reduce the limits on the core family-
based classes of admission.
• Impose flexible country limits on visas for
permanent employees, giving preference
to under represented countries and to
graduates of U.S. educational institutions
after country limits have been met.
• Require college degrees for admissions of
non-immediate family (siblings and adult
children) as well as for applicants to the
diversity lottery.
• Make authorized work status a basic labor
standard, but recognize that the effective
reduction of unauthorized employment re-
quires a comprehensive approach that ad-
dresses the fundamental causes of the
problem.
(2) Restructure the Administration of
Immigration [p. 32]
• Congress and the new Administration
should act immediately to comprehensively
restructure the management of immigra-
tion.
• The new administrative structure should
separate the enforcement of immigration
laws from the delivery of immigration ser-
vices, whether in an independent agency or
within the Department of Justice. The au-
thority and policymaking capacity of immi-
gration officials should be consolidated and
elevated.
• The INS and other agencies should collect
user fees that cover at least the cost of ser-
vices and that can be used only to fund
delivery and improvement of those services.
(3) Rationalize the Admission of Permanent
Workers [p. 33]
• Replace employer certification for admis-
sion of permanent employees with an attes-
tation requirement. Admission should
require weeks, not months or years. Small
random audits of attestation, as well as of
employers and visa holders during the first
year of employment, would strengthen ac-
countability.
(4) Rationalize the Admission of Temporary
Workers [p.35]
• Reduce the term of the H-1B visa to three
years and require that the worker demon-
strate intent to return home. This would
restore the temporary nature of this pro-
gram.
• Auction additional H-1B visas if strong de-
mand for temporary foreign labor results
in a number of petitions that exceeds the
statutory annual cap.
(5) Create Mechanisms for Flexible Policies
[p. 37]
• Congress should require its own review of
immigration policy and administration at
least once every three years.
• Congress should also create a standing
Advisory Board to analyze immigration
issues and inform congressional review.
1Immigrants have become increasingly im-
portant to our economy and workforce. Since
1970, the number of foreign-born individuals
in the United States has risen from 10 million
to 28 million. Twelve percent of the American
workforce is now foreign-born, and immigrants
comprise fully one-third of its growth. Over
one million new immigrants now join the U.S.
population each year, about 800,000 legally
and more than 100,000-300,000 (net) illegally.
Immigrants are therefore having an increas-
ing impact on the labor force and the society at
large. Particularly in the six states with the
largest immigrant populations—California,
Texas, Florida, New York, New Jersey, and
Illinois—the benefits and costs of immigration
are vividly apparent in terms of new business
growth, education, and demands on social ser-
vices.
From the perspective of economic output
and growth, legal immigration is a net benefit
to the U.S. economy. We believe there are less
easily measured benefits as well, as immigrants
have contributed significantly to the entrepre-
neurial spirit that has driven American pros-
perity. We have concluded, however, that
raising the skill levels and educational attain-
ment among workers entering the United States
can substantially increase these benefits.
U.S. immigration policy has for decades
been a battleground, where adversaries often
represent narrow interests intolerant of com-
promise. The impact of these policy debates
has been policy gridlock, in which comprehen-
sive policymaking in the national interest is
difficult. As a result, immigration policy and
implementation have failed to adapt to chang-
ing times and the demands of the global
economy.
The implementation and administration of
immigration laws are generally considered some
of the least effective functions of the Executive
Branch. Backlogs of hundreds of thousands of
people awaiting permanent visas, inadequate
funding of essential immigration functions, and
confused and contradictory regulations have
combined to create a system with little credibil-
ity, or even legitimacy, among its key stake-
holders.
Recent events have provided a compelling
example of the urgent challenges facing U.S.
immigration policy. In October 2000, Congress
enacted the American Competitiveness in the
Twenty-First Century Act (AC21). This legisla-
tion sharply increased the permitted number
of temporary immigration visas for high-tech-
nology workers (H-1B visas) to 195,000 for fis-
cal years 2001–2003, after a previous smaller
increase from 65,000 to 115,000 for fiscal years
1999–2000. AC21 followed several years of in-
tense discussion of shortages of information-
technology (IT) workers generated by both
the tightest overall U.S. labor market in de-
cades and the burgeoning of the “new
economy” sectors, such as computers, telecom-
munications, and many new services based on
IT. These sectors have recently experienced a
very strong demand for high-technology
workers, especially in certain occupations and
regions.
INTRODUCTION
2CED accepts that AC21 is a necessary re-
sponse to the exploding demand for high-
technology workers. But Congress missed an
extraordinary opportunity—one which typically
arises no more than once a decade in immigra-
tion policy—to achieve deeper, essential re-
forms that AC21 now makes all the more urgent.
As this report illustrates, the fundamental and
pervasive problems with the entire immigra-
tion system extend far beyond the need for
temporary high-technology workers. By focus-
ing narrowly on the H-1B issue and only tenta-
tively dealing with other issues, this legislation
neglects other fundamental problems.1
AC21 will intensify strains on the perma-
nent admissions system and generate expecta-
tions of transfer to permanent residency among
H-1B workers that cannot be met, given exist-
ing limitations and backlogs for green cards.
In the absence of further reforms, this policy is
likely to create an additional backlog of over
half a million U.S.-based applicants for perma-
nent residence over the next five years. It is not
difficult to envision the administrative crises,
economic disruption, and hardship for indi-
viduals that will ensue.
CED believes that such stopgap measures
also ignore homegrown solutions to the inexo-
rably growing global demand—and competi-
tion—for technical and managerial skills that
are in short supply worldwide. While immigra-
tion can play an important role in providing
skilled workers for the U.S. economy, most of
our human capital will have to be homegrown.
We cannot neglect the urgent need to improve
America’s basic education and worker train-
ing, which are essential to the creation of the
next generation of highly skilled native work-
ers.2
A central theme of this report is that the
problems of permanent and temporary visa
systems are inextricable. It is essential to ad-
dress the legal immigration system with a set of
integrated proposals. Recognizing this, we have
structured this report to yield recommenda-
tions for comprehensive reform.
We first asked two questions:
• How can immigration best improve the quality
and productivity of the U.S. workforce?
• What policy and administrative reforms are re-
quired to achieve those benefits?
In Chapter 1, we examine the future
workforce needs of the nation and ask how
well the characteristics of the immigrant popu-
lation resulting from our current system and
policies meet those needs. We conclude that
somewhat higher levels of immigration will help
to mitigate the age-related decline in the U.S.
labor force in coming decades. More immi-
grants will not offer a panacea for that looming
demographic problem. We also find that suc-
cessive waves of new immigrants have arrived
with ever lower education and skills relative to
the native population. We conclude that a
gradual shift in the composition of the immi-
grant population towards those with higher
skills will be required to meet the needs of the
rapidly evolving economy for such skills and to
allow these new Americans to assimilate into
our national life and share its benefits more
fully.
In Chapter 2 we examine our current immi-
gration policy and its implementation. We find
that the current permanent visa system, with its
predominant emphasis on family unification,
fails to address our long-term workforce needs
for permanent and higher skilled workers. Ad-
ministrative backlogs prevent the issuance of
as much as half the employment green cards
authorized each year, forcing immigrants and
employers alike to turn to temporary visas as
the makeshift route to eventual permanent sta-
tus. As a result, both the permanent and tem-
porary admission systems have become
dysfunctional. Employers and immigrants alike
have strong incentives to “game the system”
instead of playing by the rules.
Reforming Immigration
1.  AC21 does contain certain provisions directed at permanent
employment visas, processing goals, and the clearance of back-
logs.  However, as explained in Chapter 2, these provisions are at
best a first step and do not effectively address these problems.
2.  Committee for Economic Development (1994, 1996).
3In Chapter 3 we outline our proposals for
integrated reform that would produce a more
efficient and fairer system of legal immigration
that meets our society’s long-term needs. We
recommend continuing the generous policy
towards family-based and refugee admissions,
but argue for increasing opportunities for im-
migrants with higher education and skills. We
also call upon Congress for immediate action
to reform the administration of immigration
and to streamline and rationalize both the per-
manent and temporary visa systems. We are
gratified that the new Bush Administration has
indicated that it places a high priority on re-
solving some of these problems.
Immigration has become one of the most
controversial issues facing our society, espe-
cially in regions of high immigrant concentra-
tion. Yet the importance of immigration, and
the controversy surrounding it, will only in-
crease in the future, as the composition of our
population changes and our need for skilled
manpower grows. It is essential that we hon-
estly and candidly address these issues now,
despite their inherent difficulty. The longer we
wait to address them, the more difficult they
will become, and the smaller will be our eco-
nomic and political capacity to make the
necessary changes. We believe the recommen-
dations we make in this report provide the
basis for such a discussion and offer a vision of
how immigration can help create a more pro-
ductive and prosperous nation.
Introduction
4Chapter 1
IMMIGRATION AND
THE ECONOMY
America’s workforce needs will change dra-
matically during the next several decades. Our
domestic labor force will begin to decline in
absolute numbers, producing general labor scar-
city. At the same time, American business will
find itself competing globally for the services of
the “best and the brightest” as technological
progress continues to raise the demand for skills
and foreign employers increase the quality and
compensation for their jobs.
These requirements for skilled workers, of
course, only intensify the need to improve U.S.
education and to increase the supply of highly
skilled native workers, including scientists and
engineers. But immigration offers the potential
to play a supplementary role in meeting these
demands and in alleviating the economic and
fiscal problems resulting from the decline in the
native work force and the growing population of
retirees. In this chapter we examine recent trends
in the characteristics of immigrants and outline
concerns about the increasing number of un-
skilled immigrants, particularly illegal immi-
grants, who can reduce wages and opportunity
for both earlier immigrants and native workers.
We conclude that the economic benefits of
immigration can best be secured if we increase
the skill levels of new permanent residents.
AMERICA’S FUTURE
WORKFORCE NEEDS
In previous reports, CED has explored the
projected labor market in the “new economy”
with an aging population and concluded that
there will be rapidly growing demand in our
technologically oriented society for skilled work-
ers. In this context, CED has also examined the
problems of K-12 education and America’s fail-
ure to educate enough engineers and other tech-
nical professionals to meet the economy’s needs.3
Our supply of skilled manpower must ultimately
be met by training our own citizens. However,
immigration can also play an important role in
both alleviating skill shortages in rapidly grow-
ing industries and mitigating the larger demo-
graphic effects of the approaching decline in
the size of the native labor force.
The Increasing Need for Skilled Workers. The
American economy continues to demand higher
skills for an increasing number of jobs, a trend
that will likely continue for decades to come.4
The best indicator of this trend is the dramatic
increase in the “skill premium”—the widening
gap between wages paid highly skilled and less-
skilled workers. Male college graduates in 1980
earned on average 62 percent more than high
school graduates and 82 percent more than high
school dropouts; by 1998 these earnings premi-
ums were 161 and 103 percent respectively, in
spite of the fact that the relative supply of col-
lege graduates increased during this period.5
(See Figure 1.)
During the past 20 years, the fastest growth
has been in occupations requiring at least some
college education. As Figure 2 shows, jobs that
require at least an associate’s degree are pro-
3.  Committee for Economic Development (1994, 1996, 1999,
2001b).
4.  Bureau of Labor Statistics (1999: Chapter 2).
5.  Calculations by CED using Historical Income Tables of the
U.S. Census Bureau.
5SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau. Historical Income Tables:
People. Tables P-32 and P-34.
Figure 1
Mean Annual Earnings of Working-Age
Population, 1980 and 1998 (in 1998 dollars)
Figure 2
Projected Job Growth by Education
and Training Required, 1998-2008
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jected to grow much faster than total employ-
ment during 1998–2008, and jobs requiring a
bachelor’s degree will grow about two-thirds faster
than overall job growth. Jobs not requiring post-
secondary training will grow significantly slower
than the average.
Employers in many industries have recently
faced worker shortages due both to emerging
skill shortages and an extraordinarily robust
economy. Especially tight labor markets appear
to have developed in the information technol-
ogy sector (IT), but this experience has by no
means been unique. (See box, “Worker Short-
ages in Information Technology.”)
Tomorrow’s Overall Labor Scarcity. In 1950 there
were seven working-age persons for every person
65 and older in the United States. At present
there are five, and by 2030 there will be three.
Moreover, in only about 15-20 years the working
age native population will actually begin to de-
cline. This unprecedented demographic change
will create strains on the economy of several
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of
Labor. Report on the American Workforce. Washington, DC: 1999.
kinds. First, the shortage of workers will in
itself require major changes in business plan-
ning, investment, and technology to econo-
mize on labor, with new patterns of production,
consumption, and trade likely to result. Sec-
ond, the demographic shift is likely to reduce
national saving and investment, producing a
slowdown in economic growth per capita on
the order of 10 percent.6  Finally, in spite of
the current temporary federal, state, and local
budget surpluses, severe economic strains will
arise from rapidly rising public expenditures
on federal entitlement programs for the eld-
erly (Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid) and
related state and local support programs. Cur-
rent projections suggest the likelihood of large
budget deficits and/or extremely high tax bur-
dens on the working population.7
Total, all
occupations
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6.  Committee for Economic Development (1999); Turner (1998: 6).
7.  Congressional Budget Office (2000); U.S. General Account-
ing Office (2000).
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The U.S. average unemployment rate of
4.0 percent in 2000 was the lowest in 30 years,
reflecting a record nine-year economic expan-
sion. As a result, the national labor market was
extremely tight, and in particular sectors the
market was even tighter.  A 1997 study commis-
sioned by the Information Technology Associa-
tion of America found that the IT industry was
facing a shortage of 340,000 workers.8 The
methodology of this report was criticized, and a
recent report from the National Research
Council (NRC) noted that attempts to quantify
“shortages” might not be the most useful
analytical approach. Nevertheless, the NRC also
concluded, after considering other indicators,
that there has been a very tight labor market in
the information technology industry.9
Statistical indicators, including unemploy-
ment, wage growth, and the demand for
immigrant visas, provide some support for this
conclusion. In 1999, persons in core IT occupa-
tions (U.S. Census classifications) experienced
unemployment rates between 1.7 and 2.4
percent, while professional specialty occupa-
tions as a whole had a jobless rate of 1.9 per-
cent. At the same time, the national
unemployment rate was 4.1 percent.10  In this
context, the labor market for IT workers, like
that of specialty professionals in general,
appears extremely tight.
Demand in excess of supply in specific labor
markets should produce relative wage increases.
The NRC report found that average real wage
increases for computer programmers and
computer systems analysts and scientists rose
by 3.8 and 4.5 percent respectively between
1996-1999, only somewhat faster than the 3.2
percent for professional specialty occupations
as a whole, while national wage growth averaged
3.4 percent.11  (However, some private compen-
sation surveys, although these also vary consider-
8.  Freeman and Aspray (1999: 63).
9.  National Research Council (2000: 3.2, 3.8).
10.  U.S. Census Bureau (1999).
11. National Research Council (2000: 3.3.4); Bureau
of Labor Statistics (2000b).
12.  Lerman (1998).
13.  Bureau of Labor Statistics (2000); Braddock (1999:
Table 2).
14.  Bishop (1998).
ably, suggest much more rapid IT wage growth,
especially in total compensation.12 Private
surveys tend to include select workers and, to
some degree, may include stock options and
other non-wage compensation.) The evidence
suggests that the labor market has been espe-
cially tight for certain occupations, such as
computer scientists, and in certain locations
such as Silicon Valley and Seattle.
What is the Future for IT Workers?
Recent projections for the IT industry do not
suggest a slowdown in the demand for workers.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) expects
computer system analysts, engineers, and
scientists to be the fastest growing occupations
during 1998–2008, increasing by 99 percent.
Growth projected for programmers, at 29
percent, is expected to be about twice the
average. (See figure below.)13
Such projections, of course, are highly
uncertain, because the economy will adjust
in various ways to such variations in labor
demand.14  Nevertheless, the general conclusion
that rapid growth will continue seems warranted.
WORKER SHORTAGES IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
SOURCE: Braddock, Douglas. “Occupation Employment Projections
to 2008”. Monthly Labor Review. Table 2, Employment by Occupa-
tion, 1998 and projected 2008. Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, November 1999.
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Immigration, of course, will provide no pana-
cea for these problems. Indeed, it would re-
quire roughly a six-fold increase in current
immigration levels (assuming the same age
structure of immigrants) to maintain today’s
ratio of workers to retirees—an increase that
would be neither socially desirable nor politi-
cally viable.15  Nevertheless, immigration can
play an important role in alleviating these
strains and will inevitably take on greater im-
portance in the post-baby boomer workforce.
In fact, some U.S. states that are experiencing
a decline in the working age population (in
part due to emigration), such as Iowa, are al-
ready urging modifications in immigration
policy to mitigate their labor shortages.16
In the 1950s and 1960s, immigration made
no net contribution to the growth of the U.S.
working age population. Today, immigrants
provide about one-third of this growth, and
their contribution will increase dramatically in
the future. As Figure 3 shows, assuming that
today’s levels of immigration continue, immi-
grants will account for about half of working
age population growth during 2006–2015 and
for all of this growth between 2016 and 2035,
when the native working age population actu-
ally declines.
The contribution of immigration to allevi-
ating these economic strains will be determined
at least as much by the type of immigrants who
arrive on our shores as by their sheer numbers.
Dramatically increasing the number of the eld-
erly, children, or unskilled immigrants, who
are most likely to be an economic burden,
would compound the problems of elderly de-
pendency with other forms of dependency, such
as public income support. On the other hand,
young skilled immigrants can boost productiv-
ity, raise public revenues, and alleviate our de-
mographic problem. The immigrant skill mix
not only matters, but probably matters more
than the actual immigration levels.
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15.  CED estimate
16.  Strategic Planning Council of Iowa (2000: Goal 1).
IMMIGRANTS IN THE
ECONOMY TODAY
Although our immigration system is de-
scribed in the following chapter of this report,
a discussion of immigrant characteristics re-
quires a description of the major classes of
immigrant admissions.
First, immigrants are either permanent or
temporary residents. In this chapter we are con-
cerned primarily with the former; we return to
the latter, and in particular the so-called “skilled,
temporary” H-1B workers, in Chapter 2. The
major classes of admission, their education and
skill requirements, and their proportions of
1998 total admissions, are:
• family members, sponsored by previously ad-
mitted relatives, have no education or skill
requirements (72%),
20,000,000
15,000,000
10,000,000
5,000,000
0
-5,000,000
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census and Immigration and
Naturalization Service
 1996–2005 2006–2015 2016–2025 2026–2035 2036–2045
    Immigrant Growth
    Native Growth
    Net Workforce Growth
Figure 3
Immigration’s Contribution to Growth in
the Working Age Population (aged 20-64)
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• employment immigrants, sponsored by a U.S.
employer, generally must meet certain edu-
cation or skill requirements (12%),
• refugees or asylum-seekers, admitted on humani-
tarian grounds, have no education or skill
requirements (8%),
• diversity immigrants, from “underrep-
resented” countries, must have a high school
diploma (8%).
As these data show, 80 percent of legal,
permanent 1998 immigrants were subject to
no education or skill requirements. However,
in addition to these legal immigrants, an esti-
mated 100,000-300,000 (net) illegal immigrants
join the permanent U.S. population each year.17
If these illegal entrants are included, about 84-
87 percent of all immigrants are entering with-
out reference to their education or skills.
Education and Skills of Immigrants. Educa-
tion is the foundation, and a key indicator, of
the skills critical to labor market success. And
in our increasingly technology-based economy,
post-secondary education is increasingly seen
as essential for succeeding in the economic life
of the middle class.
At the top of the education distribution,
immigrants are quite comparable with natives.
The proportion of all foreign-born workers with
advanced degrees (12 percent) slightly exceeds
that of natives (10 percent), and 29-30 percent
of immigrant as well as native male and female
workers have college degrees. But, at the other
end of the educational spectrum, 32 percent of
immigrant male workers, and 25 percent of
females, have never completed high school,
compared with only 8 percent and 6 percent of
native-born males and females respectively.18
This great disproportion between poorly
educated immigrants and natives is a relatively
recent development. Over the past three de-
cades there has been a significant decline in
the education levels of new immigrants relative
to the native population. Whereas in 1960 re-
cently arrived immigrant workers and native
workers were about equally likely to have not
completed high school, by 1998 new immi-
grants were almost four times as likely as natives
to lack a high school diploma.19
This relative decline in the education levels
of new immigrants has resulted from several
factors. Family-based admissions, which have
dominated immigration numbers since 1965,
have no education or skill requirement. As
shown in Figure 4, new family-based immigrants
average close to 12 years of schooling (high
school completion), while those entering on
employment visas average 16 years (college
graduates). In addition, the education and skills
of sponsoring U.S.-resident family members are
good predictors of those they sponsor. The
personal networks that propel family immigra-
tion forward are a powerful force in determin-
ing future immigrant characteristics such as
education.
Family-based immigration, in conjunction
with the removal of national origin quotas, has
also produced a substantial shift in the nation-
ality of U.S. immigrants. As more family immi-
grants from countries with low rates of
educational attainment have been admitted,
the educational standing of new immigrants
has declined relative to natives.20  Forty years
ago, 74 percent of U.S. immigrants came from
Europe and Canada. During the 1990s, only 14
percent of new immigrants did so, while 30
percent came from Asia and 52 percent from
Latin America and the Caribbean, regions with
lower education levels on average.
19.  Borjas (1999: Table 2-1 and Figure 2-3).  The data are for
1998 and refer to civilian salaried workers 25-64 years old.
20.  Smith and Edmonston (1997: 185); Betts and Lofstrom
(2000: 55).
17. Warren (2000). Estimates of the unauthorized immigrant
population are, by their very nature, subject to great uncertainty.
The most recent unofficial estimate is that an annual average of
135,000 (net) unauthorized immigrants joined the U.S. popula-
tion during 1993–1996. This estimate is approximately one-half
of the previous official estimate of 275,000.
18. CED tabulations from Current Population Survey, CPS
March Supplement, pooled 1998-2000.
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Yet, while family-based immigrants tend to
have less education than employment-based
immigrants, the largest source of the poorly
educated is found in the illegal population. At
five million and growing, illegal immigrants
make up nearly one fifth of the foreign-born
population. As Figure 4 shows, these unautho-
rized immigrants are estimated to have only
about seven years of education on average.
Occupations and Earnings. The education and
skills of immigrants, like those of native work-
ers, play a major role in determining the jobs
they perform and their earnings from those
jobs. While immigrants comprise 12 percent of
the labor force, they are highly concentrated
in certain occupations—highly skilled jobs re-
quiring advanced degrees and very low-skill
jobs requiring little or no formal education.
(See box, “Two High-Immigrant Employment
Sectors.”) For example, as Figure 5 shows, im-
migrants make up a greatly disproportionate
share of both medical scientists and farm work-
SOURCE: Jasso, Gullermina et al. “The New Immigrant Survey
Pilot (NIS-P): Overview and new Findings About U.S. Legal
Immigrants at Admission.” Demography. February 2000; Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service. Report on the Legalized Alien
Population. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1992.
SOURCE: Current Population Survey, March 1999 Supple-
ment, Special Tabulations. http://ferret.bls.census.gov.
Figure 5
Immigrants Share of High- and
Low-Education Occupations, 1999
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ers. But immigrants comprise a much larger
proportion of the low-skill than of the high-
skill occupations. Eighty percent of produc-
tion samplers and weighers and two-thirds of
apparel and fabric workers are immigrants.
This heavy concentration of immigrants in
low-skill occupations is reflected, of course, in
the distribution of their earnings. In 1998,
immigrant males were twice as likely as natives
to have earnings in the bottom quintile of the
native wage distribution. And, in spite of heavy
immigrant representation in certain high-wage
occupations, immigrants were less likely than
natives to have very high earnings: only about
14 percent of immigrant male workers had
earnings in the top quintile of native earn-
ings.27
The earnings of immigrants relative to na-
tives have shown the same deteriorating trend
as education levels. In 1960, foreign-born work-
ers as a whole had earnings slightly above those
of native workers, while recent male immigrants
earned about 13 percent less than natives. Dur-
ing the next four decades, however, the rela-
tive earnings of successive new immigrant waves
declined sharply and consistently. Male immi-
grants arriving in the mid-1990s earned 34 per-
cent less than natives. Reflecting this trend,
foreign-born males in 1998 earned 23 percent
less than natives; for females the earnings gap
was 12 percent. 28
Although the low earnings of illegal immi-
grants undoubtedly account for a significant
proportion of the immigrant-native wage dif-
ference, the earnings and skills of new legal
immigrants have also fallen relative to those of
natives. Earnings of new non-Mexican immi-
TWO HIGH-IMMIGRANT
EMPLOYMENT SECTORS
Immigrants comprise 12 percent of the U.S.
workforce, but are found in much higher pro-
portions in certain economic sectors.21  This is
particularly true in occupations requiring spe-
cialized technical skills or advanced degrees in
science and engineering. But it is also true for
jobs that require very few skills.
University-Based R&D
Foreign graduate students, post-doctoral
fellowship recipients, and faculty researchers
are critical to many U.S. R&D enterprises. For-
eign-born individuals comprised 20 percent of
all science and engineering faculty in 1997; 36
percent of engineering professors and 26 per-
cent of math and computer science teachers
were foreign-born. Over half of post-doctoral
appointments at U.S. universities have gone to
non-U.S. citizens in recent years.22  Further,
foreign-born recipients of doctorates in science
and engineering grew at a rate of over three
times that of native-born residents from 1986 to
1997. Today, foreigners account for approxi-
mately 40 percent of all science and engineer-
ing doctorates earned at American
universities.23
Agriculture
No industry depends more on immigrant
labor than agriculture, which employs nearly
2.5 million workers. Nearly 15 percent of all
immigrants, most of whom are Mexican, work
in agriculture.24  An estimated 600,000 agricul-
tural laborers work in the United States ille-
gally, heavily concentrated in certain crops and
states.25
In California, which has the largest number
of agricultural jobs, immigrants play a signifi-
cant role. By some estimates immigrant workers
supply nearly all of the farm labor in California.
Unfortunately, many rural communities run on
a boom-and-bust cycle that follows seasonal
demand, and some communities now have
large year-round illegal populations with high
rates of poverty.26
21.  Greenhouse (2000).
22.  National Science Foundation (2000: Tables 4-45 and 4-46).
23.  National Science Foundation (2000: Table 4-41); Bouvier
and Simcox (1994: 52).
24.  Smith and Edmonston (1997: 149).
25.  U.S. General Accounting Office (1997: 5)
26.  Taylor and Martin (1997: 855).
27.  Borjas (1999: 23 and Figure 2-1).
28.  Borjas (1999: Figures 2-1, 2-4 and Table 2-1).
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grants, where the illegal component is less im-
portant, show much the same pattern during
1960–1998 as the earnings of all immigrants.
Similarly, an examination of the reported oc-
cupations of three cohorts of legal immigrants
admitted in 1977, 1982, and 1994 led the Na-
tional Research Council to conclude that “…the
same general trend of declining relative qual-
ity of immigrant cohorts is found using legal
immigrants only.”29
Several decades ago, new immigrants, while
initially earning less than natives, eventually
gained experience and caught up economi-
cally. Immigrants typically narrowed the start-
ing wage gap by about 10 percentage points
during the first two decades after immigration.
As a result of rapid assimilation, immigrants
eventually earned on average as much as or
slightly more than native-born workers—about
1 percent more in 1970 for example.30
However, this strong convergence of earn-
ings no longer occurs. Today new immigrants
with lower skills may never catch up with simi-
lar natives.31  Mexican immigrants, whose wages
at admission were particularly low, experienced
no convergence of relative wages during 1970–
1990, and the gap may have widened.32  Com-
pounding the problem of lower relative
earnings is the large increase in the numbers
of new immigrants. For both these reasons,
upward mobility and middle-class assimilation
have become more difficult. Falling education
levels have weakened immigrant wage assimila-
tion. Over half the wage gap between today’s
immigrants and natives can be attributed to
poor immigrant schooling.33
Differences in earnings are closely related
to legal status as a result of the education dif-
ferences among different classes of admission
described above. While there are no data pro-
viding earnings of immigrants by detailed class
of admission, the sparse evidence available in-
dicates that employment-based immigrants, at
the time they are officially admitted into green
card status, have earnings that are more than
twice those of family-based immigrants and as
much as three times those of illegal immi-
grants.34/35  Family immigrants appear to nar-
row this gap appreciably over time,36 but illegal
immigrants do not. As Figure 6 shows, the
households of naturalized citizens have earn-
ings on average about two-thirds larger than
those of unauthorized workers, and the earn-
ings of permanent aliens are about one-third
29.  Borjas (1999: Figure 2-4); Smith and Edmonston (1997: 194
and Table 5-10).
30.  Borjas (2000: Table 1.1).
31.  Borjas (2000: Chapter 1); Smith and Edmonston (1997: 194-
203).
32.  Smith and Edmonston (1997: 202).
33.  Betts and Lofstrom (2000: 109).
34.  Some of this difference may be attributable to the fact that
many employment-based immigrants have worked in the U.S.
for several years on temporary visas prior to obtaining a green
card.
35.  Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith (2000)
36.  Lowell (1997).
SOURCE: Passel, Jeffrey. “A Nation Re-Made: A New Genera-
tion of Immigrants to the United States.” Urban Institute
Report, Forthcoming. Note: Households are classified
according to the legal status of the household head. Earnings
represent the sum of all household earnings regardless of an
individual’s status within the household. Unauthorized
households are, on average, larger and may have more adult
earners per household.
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of 0.04-0.13 percent of GDP, or roughly $4-13
billion in today’s economy.37
This calculation, however, masks an impor-
tant point. Immigration produces both eco-
nomic winners and losers, and their total gains
and losses are substantially larger than the small
net benefit found by combining them. As noted
below, these gains and losses can be quite im-
portant to particular groups of workers, con-
sumers, industries, and regions, even though
they also are small in relation to the economy
as a whole. Those concerned with the adverse
impacts of immigration emphasize the costs to
individual groups and regions, as well as the
small size of the net benefits. They also argue
that important non-economic costs are missing
from the equation. Immigration advocates, on
the other hand, point not only to the net ben-
efits, but also to the special characteristics of
certain immigrant groups and their large con-
tributions to specific sectors, such as scientific
research and information technology.
The Benefits of Skilled and Entrepreneurial
Immigrants. The U.S. economy benefits most
when immigrants complement—that is, differ
from and add to—the native-born workforce
in terms of abilities, skills, and the willingness
to undertake certain jobs.38  Thus both low-
skill immigrant workers in agriculture and high-
skill specialized scientists make substantial
economic contributions.
The economic benefits of highly skilled
workers may be significantly understated in
conventional economic models. Highly skilled
immigrants are very productive and work in
high value-added sectors of the economy, and
sometimes fill critical gaps for which domestic
workers may be unavailable, or available only
at much higher cost. In addition, these highly
skilled immigrants help produce innovations
that put America on the cutting edge of the
information age, creating new technologies,
products, and exports.
larger. As discussed below, these average differ-
ences are reflected in much higher rates of
poverty among the least-educated immigrant
households. Furthermore, since the earnings
of immigrants greatly affect the opportunities
that their children have, these differences can
persist into the next generation.
ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF IMMIGRATION
The economic effects of immigration on
the U.S. economy and its consumers, workers,
and businesses reflect both the numbers and
characteristics of the immigrants, as well as the
complex ways in which labor and product mar-
kets adjust to immigration. The economic ef-
fects on different groups of natives and different
regions also vary greatly.
Immigration Produces Positive but Small Net
Economic Benefits. Immigration generally pro-
vides large economic benefits to the immigrants
themselves, whose earnings are usually signifi-
cantly higher than in their countries of origin,
even though they are sometimes very low by
American standards. This powerful “job mag-
net” is why they voluntarily (and eagerly) seek
admission and why immigration barriers are so
hard to enforce.
There is also general agreement that immi-
gration provides a net economic benefit to
U.S. natives as a whole. (This benefit excludes
possible changes in native tax burdens, as dis-
cussed below.) This is because the contribu-
tion of immigrant labor to U.S. output and
income is greater than just the earnings of the
immigrants themselves; this additional income
accrues to the U.S. economy in the form of
lower prices to consumers, higher wages to
workers with complementary skills, and/or
higher returns to land and capital. In relation
to our $10 trillion economy, these net gains
are quite modest, at least as estimated by con-
ventional economic models. The National Re-
search Council, in reviewing such models,
suggested a net economic benefit in the range
37.  Smith and Edmonston (1997: 153).
38.  Smith and Edmonston (1997: 136-142).
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Immigrant scientists and engineers also con-
tribute disproportionately to research and de-
velopment (R&D), adding greater value than
their numbers alone would suggest. R&D, which
has proved to be an important driver of inno-
vation, is critical for a strong U.S. economy.39
Foreign scientists and engineers also garner
more patents and citations than their native-
born peers.40  Technological skill and entre-
preneurship have contributed to the success of
Silicon Valley, where research and technology-
based industries have benefited enormously
from immigrant researchers and entrepreneurs
(see box, “Chinese and Indian Immigrants in
Silicon Valley”).41
A growing body of evidence suggests that
the economic returns from investments in the
high technology sector, in which immigrants
have played a major role, may be much larger
than previously estimated.42  There is striking
anecdotal evidence of immigrants’ contribu-
tions in this sector not only as workers, but also
as entrepreneurs and inventors.43  For example,
Sun Microsystems reports that immigrant em-
ployees created both the Java computer lan-
guage and the SPARC microprocessor,
technological innovations that ultimately cre-
ated thousands of new jobs for the company.44
The United States leads the world in many
areas of R&D and technological innovation.
Our R&D enterprises attract the world’s best
researchers, who want to work in premier uni-
versities and corporate labs. Similarly, because
the rewards for successful entrepreneurship
are very high in the United States, we attract
many of the most ambitious entrepreneurs—
those who have the best ideas for new products
or services, or possess technical or managerial
skills that will help build successful businesses.
These activities of highly skilled immigrants
illustrate a fundamental point—the strong in-
terdependence in our post-industrial economy
between skills, new technology, and the capital
investments that embody it. Skills enhance the
development of technology and the productiv-
ity of capital. In line with this relationship, a
recent analysis of the impact of skilled and
unskilled immigration finds that shifting the
composition of U.S. immigrants towards those
with higher skills would raise the economic
benefits of immigration for the nation.45
Two reservations to these generally positive
impacts of skilled immigrants should be noted.
The first is their potential to hold in check the
wages of native workers with similar skills. The
NRC recently reported that “the current size of
the H-1B [temporary immigrant] workforce
keeps…wages from rising as fast as might be
expected in a tight labor market.”46  In weaker
labor markets, such restraining effects on the
wages of skilled workers could be problematic,
although they also tend to mitigate the recent
national increase in earnings inequality. The
second concern is the incentive provided to
employers to seek new employees, including
immigrants, rather than retrain other native
workers. Although this view has only anecdotal
support, it is held and expressed forcefully by
many advocates of IT workers. Recognizing
both of these concerns, our recommendations
in Chapter 3 are designed to provide flexibility
regarding the levels of immigrant admissions,
make the “temporary” visa system genuinely
temporary, and create incentives to support
and retrain domestic workers.
Low-Skilled Immigrants—Benefits and Costs.
The large influx of immigrants with relatively
little education and skills during recent de-
cades has added significantly to the U.S. low-
skill labor force. For example, immigration
increased the number of high school dropouts39.  Committee for Economic Development (1998: 10).
40.  Levin and Stephan (1999: 1213).
41.  Saxenian (1999: Chapter 5).
42.  Committee for Economic Development (1998: Chapter 2).
43.  Saxenian (1999); Warner (2000); Black (2000).
44.  Alvares (1998).
45.  Borjas (1999: 101-103)
46.  National Research Council (2000: 5.5).
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by about 21 percent between 1979 and 1995.53
These unskilled workers undoubtedly make
substantial economic contributions in the jobs
they fill—as farm workers, garment workers,
housekeepers and cleaners, cooks and wait-
resses, child care workers, taxi drivers, and in
many other occupations. The benefits to na-
tive Americans from their work show up most
commonly as lower prices for the goods and
services they produce.
These benefits, however, come at the very
considerable cost of reducing wages for un-
skilled workers generally in the U.S. economy,
thereby adding to the downward pressure on
the earnings of low-income Americans that has
become a prominent and problematic feature
of a labor market increasingly demanding more
Thirty-two percent of Silicon Valley’s science
and engineering workforce is foreign-born, the
vast majority Chinese or Indian. Chinese and
Indian engineers run one-quarter of all Silicon
Valley high-tech businesses. In 1998, these firms
employed 58,282 workers (14 percent of the
technology work force) and took in over $16
billion in total sales (17 percent of all firm
sales).47  According to Fortune magazine, Indian
immigrants have “created companies that ac-
count for $235 billion of market value.”48
The background and development of Silicon
Valley’s Chinese and Indian immigrant popula-
tions is remarkably similar. Both point to educa-
tion and networks. Many of Silicon Valley’s
Indian-born workers were educated at one of
six Indian Institutes of Technology, while a large
proportion of the Chinese are graduates from
one of several engineering universities in
Taiwan. The level of training in these institu-
tions is regarded as equal to that of America’s
Ivy League schools.49
An array of immigrant-oriented professional
organizations in Silicon Valley provides immi-
grants with professional contacts and informa-
tion. Groups such as the Silicon Valley Indian
Professionals Association (SIPA) and The Indus
Entrepreneurs (TiE) were created as a means of
bringing Indian immigrants together for social
as well as business reasons.50  Similarly, a group
of Taiwanese engineers started a branch of the
Chinese Institute of Engineers in San Francisco
in 1979.
Once established in the United States, these
highly skilled immigrants often lend their knowl-
edge and success to others. Kanwal Rehki, an
Indian entrepreneur reportedly worth $500
million, is head of TiE.51  Formerly the chief
technology officer at Novell, Rehki has person-
ally supported more than 45 Indian startups.
Many immigrants also return to their native
countries as entrepreneurs and investors, creat-
ing contacts that open new markets for their
U.S.-based firms. This process of reverse migra-
tion and cross-investment may help to explain
why exports to the Asia-Pacific region are now
nearly four times higher than exports to compa-
rable countries in other parts of the world.52
Such activities also help to alleviate concerns
about brain drain from these countries, as India
and China benefit from the successes of their
expatriates in the United States.
CHINESE AND INDIAN IMMIGRANTS IN SILICON VALLEY
skills. The size of these wage reductions is con-
troversial, since the immigration of low-skill
workers gives rise to geographical movements
of workers (both native and immigrant) and
capital and other changes in their behavior.
These changes diffuse the economic effects of
immigration from high-immigration localities
across the national economy, making them dif-
ficult to measure directly. Nevertheless, a re-
47.  Saxenian (1999: Chapter 4).
48.  Saxenian (1999: 5).
49.  Warner (2000).
50.  Warner (2000).
51.  Saxenian (1999: Table 3.1).
52.  Warner (2000).
53.  Borjas (1999: 83).
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cent careful analysis suggests that immigration
increased the wage differential between high
school dropouts and other workers by 3-6 per-
centage points during 1980–1995, accounting
for roughly one-quarter to one-half of the large
increase in that gap from 30 percent to 41
percent during that period.54  The wages of
earlier immigrants are likely to be most ad-
versely affected by further immigration to the
labor markets where they are concentrated.55
Poverty and Fiscal Costs. Another important
cost of low-skill immigration pertains to its im-
pact on government revenues and spending.
Poor households are more likely to need gov-
ernment assistance than other households,
while they contribute less in taxes. Immigrants
today make up more than one-fifth of the U.S.
population living in poverty, twice their pro-
portion of  the total population. Again, educa-
tion and skills play a significant role. Thirty
percent of adult immigrants with less than a
high school education live in poverty, com-
pared with just 8 percent of those who are
college graduates.56
Estimates by the National Research Council
indicate that immigrant households as a whole
provide a net benefit to the federal govern-
ment, but are a net burden to certain state and
local governments by lowering tax revenues
and consuming public expenditures. State and
local governments are primarily responsible
for the public services used by immigrants and,
in particular, the cost of education for their
children. For high-immigration states these ef-
fects can be dramatic: in the extreme case of
California, immigrant households in the mid-
1990s had on average a negative “net fiscal
balance” (taxes paid less public expenditures
received) of almost $3,500, which raised the
tax burden of the average native households by
nearly $1,200.57  Unsurprisingly, illegal immi-
grant households tend to generate the greatest
fiscal costs to local government.58  Not only do
they earn very little and pay correspondingly
little in taxes, but they also tend to be larger
than average and send more (often U.S.-born)
children to local schools.59
Such short-term accounting can be mislead-
ing, however. As immigrants assimilate they
earn more, pay more in taxes, and draw less
heavily on some public services. Expenditures
on immigrant children are investments in hu-
man capital that can produce future benefits,
both in higher productivity and wages and in
social assimilation. To reflect such factors, the
NRC has also made estimates of the very long-
term fiscal impact of current immigration, tak-
ing into account the future taxes and public
expenditures related to the children and suc-
ceeding generations of current immigrants.
These estimates show a positive net fiscal bal-
ance (as a discounted net present value, for all
levels of government) of $80,000 for an average
1994 immigrant. Because this estimate is ex-
tremely sensitive to assumptions about future
tax rates, the precise value is quite uncertain
and of limited interest. More reliable, and of
much greater importance in our view, are the
dramatic estimated differences in fiscal impact
between immigrants with different education
levels. The NRC finds that a high school drop-
out would have a (long-term) impact of nega-
tive $13,000, compared with $51,000 for a high
school graduate and $198,000 for an immi-
grant with more than a high school educa-
tion.60  Clearly education and skills make an
enormous difference to the fiscal effects of
immigration, as well as to its overall economic
effects.
57. Smith and Edmonston (1997: Chapter 6)
58. Passel and Clark (1998: Section III).
59. Greenwood and Tienda (1997: 258).
60. Smith and Edmonston (1997: 350).
54.  Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997: Tables 12, 18, pp. 47, 62).
55.  Greenwood and Tienda (1997: 251-394).
56. Camarota (1999: Table 3).
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CONCLUSION:
THE NEED FOR MORE
HIGH-SKILLED IMMIGRANTS
To meet our impending workforce needs,
we require a system that modestly increases
legal immigration and places more emphasis
on education and skills, both in setting criteria
for admission and enforcing them. If immigra-
tion policy and enforcement continue, in ef-
fect, to favor overwhelmingly immigrants with
little education and skills, progressively fewer
immigrants, and fewer of their children, will
succeed and contribute economically or assimi-
late socially.61
Beyond an emphasis on skills, we also need
a flexible immigration system that can respond
to changing economic conditions. While the
broad features of tomorrow’s economy are vis-
ible, its detailed characteristics and short-term
variability will surprise us. During the sustained
growth of the 1990s, immigrants were espe-
cially valuable in supplying labor to meet ex-
61. Borjas (1999: Chapter 7).
panding demand and, as a by-product, temper-
ing wage inflation. Economic conditions, how-
ever, inevitably change. Industrial sectors, and
the economy as a whole, will expand and some-
times contract. As the economy cools, a contin-
ued influx of immigrants may create significant
social and economic problems.62  The experi-
ence of California during the economic slump
of the early 1990s showed how hostile and anti-
immigrant the social and political climate can
become. While such responses may reflect la-
tent nativist sentiment, they may also result
from the competition of newcomers in labor
markets with slack demand.63
For the long-term, we must improve the
skills of our native-born labor force through
education reform and worker training. Immi-
gration cannot and should not be a substitute
for those endeavors. But immigration, prop-
erly managed, can supplement them in ad-
dressing both our short- and longer-term
economic and demographic needs.
62. Goldsborough (2000: 89).
63. Bean, Hook and Fossett (1999: 31-64).
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IMMIGRATION POLICY TODAY
The U.S. system for immigrant admissions
is in disrepair. Its regulatory mechanisms are
poorly conceived, the bureaucracies that imple-
ment immigration policy function incoherently,
and the entire system lacks flexibility in re-
sponding to change. Hundreds of thousands
of applicants for legal entry and permanent
residence languish in backlogs, waiting to be
approved or issued a final status. Employers go
to great pains to hire foreign talent with no
assurance that their needs will be met in a
timely fashion. As a result, there is little public
confidence in America’s immigration policies.
PERMANENT, TEMPORARY, AND
ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS
There are numerous categories of admis-
sion to the United States. Each applies uniquely
to the circumstances or conditions that govern
the means of entry, length of stay, and the
rights accorded to individuals once in the
United States. However, there are three broad
categories of entry:
• Legal permanent admission as a “green card”
immigrant, either under the sponsorship of
a U.S. family member or employer or to
seek refuge from persecution. After a five-
year stay, permanent residents are eligible
to apply for naturalization.
• Legal temporary admission for various autho-
rized purposes including tourism, business,
study, cultural exchange, or employment
with a U.S. firm. (In technical terms, these
are “non-immigrants.”)
• Illegal entry either for a short stay or with the
intent to stay permanently, generally to find
U.S. employment.
Legal permanent admissions currently run
about 800,000 yearly. Temporary admissions
are inherently difficult to quantify, but about
six million such visas are issued each year. Most
of these are for tourism or business, and fewer
than 200,000 are for employment. Illegal en-
trants are believed to add about 100,000-300,000
persons (net) each year to the permanent resi-
dent population, although many more, whose
numbers are unknown, seek unauthorized work
for periods of less than a year.
Rapidly increasing legal and illegal immi-
gration has caused a significant rise in the num-
ber of foreign-born United States residents,
from 10.5 million in 1970 to 28.4 million in
2000.64  The movement of permanent residents
to the United States increased sharply follow-
ing the Immigration Act of 1965. Today, the
foreign-born account for 10 percent of the
U.S. population and about 12 percent of the
labor force. Immigrants account for 40 per-
cent of the growth of our population and about
one-third of labor force growth.
64. Hansen and Faber (1997); Camarota (2000: 1).
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CURRENT IMMIGRATION POLICY
UNDERVALUES SKILLS
The legal admission system is inherited, with
interim modifications, from the Immigration
Act of 1965. (See box, “Origins of the U.S.
Immigration System.”) That legislation recti-
fied four decades of quotas that barred Asians
and many southern and eastern Europeans, as
well as refugees, from coming to America.
Today’s admission system builds on the Immi-
gration Act of 1990. It strongly favors immi-
grants who fulfill our commitment to family
and humanitarian principles but places rela-
tively little emphasis on the education and skills
that are critical to economic assimilation.
There are numerous classes and subclasses
of permanent admissions, whose numbers vary
somewhat from year to year. (See Appendix A:
Legal Permanent Resident Classes of Admis-
sion and Admissions in 1998.) The most im-
portant classes, with their annual numerical
limits and the numbers admitted in 1998, are:
Numerically Unlimited Admissions
• Immediate relatives (spouses, minor children, par-
ents) of U.S. citizens: 283,368 admitted in 1998
Prior to 1965, immigration to the United
States was controlled by a national origins quota
system that came into effect in 1924 following
decades of mass immigration—25.8 million
persons between 1881 and 1924. That system
allocated visas on the basis of the ethnic compo-
sition of the U.S. population. Applicants from
Great Britain and Germany, for example, were
allocated 60 percent of all visas. Asian immi-
grants were banned.
The Immigration Act of 1965
The 1965 law significantly altered the size and
quality of immigrant flows:
• The use of national origin quotas was ended;
• Total numerical limits on admissions were
raised;
• The system of admission preferences was
amended, giving top priority to family reuni-
fication and reserving less than 20 percent of
visas for employment purposes;
• Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens were
exempted from numerical caps, further em-
phasizing family reunification over other
objectives.
In 1965, the civil rights movement was at its
peak, and there was a desire to change immigra-
tion policy to be more equitable to prospective
immigrants from all countries. In addition, a
restrictive U.S. immigration policy was seen as
inconsistent with our strong opposition to Com-
munist regimes around the world. Immigration
had also been relatively low for many years, and
the strong mid-1960s economy left little appre-
hension about the nation’s ability to absorb
larger immigrant flows. Concerns about the
impact of immigration on domestic workers,
however, limited the role that employment-
based visas would play in the new policy regime.
The Immigration Act of 1990
Several important changes were made after
1965, notably the establishment of refugees as a
separate admission category in 1980 and the
granting of amnesty to illegal immigrants in
1986. The Immigration Act of 1990 changed
little of the basic structure of the 1965 Act, but
revised certain features:
• The total number of visas granted was in-
creased by about 40 percent;
• Employment visas for permanent residence
were increased from 54,000 to 140,000;
• A diversity lottery for persons from under-
represented nations was established.
While the number of skilled immigrants
did rise substantially, the concurrent growth
in immediate relatives, refugees, and diver-
sity program immigrants has meant that em-
ployment-based immigration has risen only
slightly as a share of the total.
ORIGINS OF THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
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• Refugees and asylum-seekers: admissions set pe-
riodically by the President in consultation
with Congress; 54,645 admitted in 1998
Numerically Limited Admissions
• Family-sponsored: adult children or siblings
of U.S. citizens and spouses and children of
resident aliens; limit of 226,000; 191,480
admitted in 1998
• Employment-based: prospective workers, spon-
sored in most cases by U.S. employers, and
their immediate family members; limit of
140,000 (including family members); 77,517
admitted in 1998
• Diversity: admitted by lottery from “under
represented” regions, such as African coun-
tries; limit of 55,000; 45,499 admitted in
1998
As Figure 7 shows, family-based immigrants
enter the U.S. in far greater numbers than the
employment, refugee, and diversity classes com-
bined. From 1994 through 1998, citizens’ im-
mediate relatives and other family-sponsored
immigrants comprised about 65 percent of ad-
missions; approximately 62 percent were
spouses or minor children of citizens or per-
manent residents.65  Employment-based immi-
gration, the only type requiring that the
principal immigrant have a bachelor’s degree
or special skills, has not exceeded 16 percent
of the total in any year during the past two
decades.
Within employment-based admissions, there
are five classes:
• (EB-1) priority workers (experienced profes-
sors, multinational executives, or athletes
with extraordinary ability). This class de-
mands the highest evidence of skills and
does not require employer sponsorship.
• (EB-2) professionals (persons with advanced
degrees or exceptional ability) often for sci-
entists or business persons.
• (EB-3) skilled workers (persons with at least a
bachelor’s degree or special skills such as
computer programmers). This class includes
a special allotment of 10,000 visas to
“needed” but non-skilled workers. Both (EB-
2) and (EB-3) require employer sponsor-
ship and government certification that con-
crete steps have been taken in advance to
protect domestic workers.
• (EB-4) special immigrants (religious workers,
for example)
• (EB-5) employment creation (entrepreneurs
and investors), which is little used.
Numerically limited family-sponsored admis-
sions are also limited to 7 percent of the total
for any individual country. Until recently this
limitation also applied to employment-based
admissions, but the legislative changes in Octo-
ber 2000 have largely removed it. (See box on
SOURCE: Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S.
Department of Justice. 1998 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 2000.
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65. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2000: Immigrants,
Table 4).
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AC21 legislation, page 23.) Since networks of
families and others of common origin drive
immigration, a very few countries can (and to
some degree already do) dominate admissions.
Both the country limits and the diversity admis-
sions class were adopted to mitigate this domi-
nation. At the same time, however, when the
demand for particular employment skills is be-
ing satisfied from only a few countries, as is
currently the case with India and China, turn-
ing away green card applicants after their
country’s cap has been reached may leave posi-
tions unfilled. In Chapter 3, we recommend a
flexible system of preferences for employment-
based admissions to ensure future diversity as
well as an adequate pool of skilled workers.
TEMPORARY VISAS FOR TOURISM,
STUDY, AND WORK
Whereas legal permanent residents are ad-
mitted with the understanding that they may
one day choose to become naturalized citizens,
legal temporary visas in principle are granted
with the understanding that the grantee will
return home. Temporary migrants are permit-
ted to stay in the United States for periods
ranging from a few days or months to several
years. All, with the exception of two visa
classes—the H-1B specialty worker and the L
intra-company transferee—must clearly estab-
lish their intent to return. Furthermore, tem-
porary migrants are given only a limited set of
legal rights while here, and only a small share
of temporary migrants is authorized to work
for U.S. employers.
Most temporary visas are not bound by an-
nual limits. Temporary visitors, including tour-
ists and persons conducting business
transactions, comprise by far the largest and
fastest growing class, about 75 percent of the
5.5 million individual visas issued in 1997. About
300,000 visas were issued for cultural exchange
and for foreign students. In terms of business
use, 80,000 visas were issued for intra-company
transferees, and 152,000 were issued to work-
ers of all types (skilled and unskilled) in 1997.
The balance of temporary visas was issued to
diplomats, foreign representatives, and special
classes such as crewmen or temporary boarder
crossers. (See Appendix B: Temporary Visa Cat-
egories and Issuances in 1997.)
The largest and currently most controver-
sial category of temporary work visas is that for
the so-called “Specialty Worker” or H-1B pro-
gram. The H-1B visa is designed to provide the
American economy with skilled foreign work-
ers. This visa permits workers to reside and
work in the United States for a total of six years;
it is issued initially for a three-year period and
may be renewed once. The H-1B worker must
hold at least the equivalent of a bachelor’s
degree, and employment must be in an occu-
pation requiring application of a highly spe-
cialized body of knowledge.
WORKER POLICIES THAT
DON’T WORK
Bottlenecks and delays for immigrating for-
eign workers have plagued the permanent sys-
tem and recently surfaced in the temporary
admission system. These delays not only high-
light failures in the admission regulatory mecha-
nisms, but also indicate fundamental problems
in the principles underlying the temporary
system and its relationship to the permanent
system.
Employers who sponsor foreign workers
must first meet certain requirements. In the
case of permanent workers, the certification
and petition processes currently take years. For
temporary workers, however, a simplified attes-
tation and petition process takes weeks or
months. Out of frustration with delays in the
permanent worker system, employers have
turned to the temporary work system with its
faster approval process. Prospective immigrants
faced with waiting lists, delays, and enormous
uncertainty in the permanent system use the
temporary system as the preferred means of
entry.
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The H-1B “temporary” visa has thus now
become the de facto transition to permanent
residency and employment. At least half of the
H-1B workers apply for permanent status.66
Consequently, immigrant workers have over-
whelmed the temporary visa system. If immi-
grant workers enter the United States intending
to stay permanently, and their employers are
placing them in permanent jobs, it is incongru-
ous that they should enter under a temporary
system. With an effective permanent visa sys-
tem, there would be far less dependence on
temporary visas.
Problems with “Certification” for Permanent
Employment. The regulatory burdens associated
with applying for permanent employment-
based visas have long been recognized. It can
take two to three years for workers to go through
the entire process of obtaining permanent resi-
dence, and in some, not uncommon, cases the
wait may be eight to ten years. While there are
significant regional variations, up to four years
of the delay is associated with the labor certifi-
cation process.67  As discussed below, this wait
is the product of both cumbersome regula-
tions and increasingly poor management. In
the end, the excessively slow process produces
unreasonable impediments to normal business
hiring.
Before hiring a foreign worker on a perma-
nent basis, an employer must submit a Perma-
nent Labor Certification to the Department of
Labor (DOL). Subsequent to certification, an
employer must also submit to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) a petition
showing that the immigrant meets a visa’s re-
quirements, such as educational attainment.
In principle, labor certification is intended to
protect the employment and working condi-
tions of domestic workers. The DOL has tradi-
tionally processed each labor certification by
hand, confirming that the employer has, among
other requirements, attempted to find a do-
mestic worker for the open position and that
the immigrant will be paid the position’s “pre-
vailing wage.” Because each DOL certification
must be verified in this fashion, the process
can take years. In addition, such delays and
burdens create a large incentive for both em-
ployers and immigrants to evade the rules.
The system also imposes great administra-
tive burdens on private employers. Employers
must first list job openings in the State Employ-
ment Security Agencies, an unlikely source of
skilled workers. The prevailing wages, difficult
to determine at best, are certified on a case-by-
case basis. In the end there is little relationship
between conditions at the time of employment
and those that are initially certified. According
to a review of the employment program by the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
“the labor certification system has lost even the
appearance of protecting native-born workers
and jobs.”68
The DOL has proposed or implemented a
number of reforms intended to improve pro-
gram efficiency, including expedited process-
ing of some applications and immediate
certification of “shortage occupation” visas.
Unfortunately, these approaches have failed
due to methodological or other implementa-
tion difficulties. The DOL recently announced
a comprehensive reform to be implemented in
2001 to restructure labor certification and speed
processing.69  Under this plan, employers will
bypass the state employment offices and fax
applications directly to DOL to be reviewed
only for completeness; a small number of ap-
plications would be audited for accuracy. These
reforms are laudable, but it remains to be seen
whether DOL can implement the new ap-
proach.
“Temporary” H-1B Visas and Their Implica-
tions. Employers seeking temporary H-1B work-
ers are required only to attest to having met
certain conditions, subjecting them to later
enforcement action for noncompliance. The
66. Lowell (1998: 9).
67. National Research Council (2000: 5-6).
68. Papademtriou and Yale-Loehr (1996: 109).
69. In principle, this process would be similar to the attestations
used to process the approval for a temporary H-1B visa.
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DOL does not have to pre-certify that the con-
ditions have actually been met and, by law,
should process the attestation within seven days.
As with permanent employment visas, a peti-
tion must also be submitted to INS before a
visa can be issued, but the use of attestation in
lieu of certification shortens the process by
years. (However, recent sharp increases in the
demand for H-1B visas have begun to produce
delays in this system as well.)70
Demand for H-1B visas accelerated rapidly
after 1997, causing demand (as measured by
total applications) to exceed the statutory
limits, even though these were sharply raised.
(See Figure 8.) In fiscal year 1997, ending on
September 30, the 65,000 limit was reached in
August, and in 1998 by the end of May. In
response, Congress passed the 1998 American
Competitiveness and Work Force Improvement
SOURCE: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical
Branch.
*Estimated demand is the number of individuals receiving
H-1B visas plus additional petitions received after the cap was
reached. 1999 estimated demand includes approximately
22,000 mistakenly over-issued visas, but may exclude some
additional petitions received. 2000 estimated demand is based
upon preliminary informal INS estimates.
70. U.S. General Accounting Office (2000c:23)
Figure 8
Estimated Demand for H-1B Visas*
Act (ACWFIA), which increased the cap to
115,000 for 1999 and 2000.71  Even these higher
limits were insufficient to meet demand, and
the new limit was reached in June of fiscal year
1999 and again in March of 2000.
In the face of this burgeoning demand and
intensive lobbying by the IT industry, Congress
passed the American Competitiveness in the
Twenty-First Century Act (AC21) in October
2000. This law further increased the number of
H-1B visas to 195,000 for fiscal years 2001-2003,
permits an unlimited number of H-1B workers
to fill jobs in universities and nonprofit re-
search institutions, and makes other changes.
(See box, “American Competitiveness in the
Twenty-First Century Act.”)
Unfortunately, while rectifying a difficult
short-term problem, AC21 has created new dif-
ficulties. Increasing the number of H-1B visas
without rationalizing either the temporary or
the permanent system will exacerbate present
and future problems in both.
H-1B workers can stay in the United States
for up to six years, hardly a period of “tempo-
rary” stay. During this lengthy period many
H-1B workers become established in their com-
munities and workplaces. As a result, most
H-1B workers and their employers fully expect
a conversion to permanent status, regardless of
whether or not the permanent admissions sys-
tem can actually absorb them. Further, the
H-1B program permits the foreign worker to
declare an intent to stay either temporarily or
permanently; virtually all other temporary visa
holders must demonstrate intent to return to
their countries of origin after their visas ex-
pire. This very weak test of temporary intent
sends an ambiguous message and represents at
best a minimal effort to ensure return.
When individual country limits on perma-
nent employment-based visas were in effect,
about 25,000 H-1B visaholders were expected
to adjust annually from temporary to green
1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   2000   2001   2002  2003
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
Estimated Demand
       Annual Ceiling
71. The bill also introduced additional worker protections for so-
called H-1B dependent firms, those in which H-1B workers com-
prise 15 percent or more of the workforce.
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In October 2000 Congress passed the Ameri-
can Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century
Act (AC21), which introduces many changes in
the H-1B visa:
Increases the statutory limit on H-1Bs. The
number of H-1B visas that can be issued is in-
creased to 195,000 for fiscal years 2001-2003.
Under previous law, the limits were 107,500 for
2001, and 65,000 for 2002 and 2003.
Removes the limit on H-1B visas for universi-
ties and research institutions. H-1B visas issued
for employees of colleges and universities are no
longer counted against the annual cap. Likewise,
the annual limit on visas does not apply to em-
ployees of nonprofit or government research
organizations. This provision will add to the
number of H-1B visas issued, possibly beyond the
195,000 annual limits.
Makes the H-1B visa more portable. H-1B
workers may switch employers as soon as a new
employer files a petition with the INS. Former law
necessitated the approval of a petition before a
worker could change employers.
Increases H-1B fees dedicated to training. In
conjunction with H.R. 5362, AC21 raises the
AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ACT
H-1B fee from $500 to $1000. The bulk of the
fee goes to DOL and NSF programs that support
education and training for native-born students
and workers.
Lifts country limits on permanent employ-
ment visas. The 7 percent individual country
limit on permanent employment visas no longer
applies when the total number of applications
received is less than the annual limit.
Extends stays during processing of applica-
tions for permanent status. Foreign H-1B work-
ers may stay beyond six years if their green card
applications have been in processing for at least
a year. One-year extensions may be granted until
the employment visa is adjudicated and adjust-
ment of status is final.
Processing goals and backlog clearance. The
Act sets “processing goals” of 180 days for immi-
grant benefits and 30 days for temporary (H-1B)
petitions. It also creates an account for INS to
draw upon to reduce current backlogs. INS must
present Congress with a Backlog Elimination
Plan that includes a review of data systems and
quality controls and that estimates the costs asso-
ciated with carrying out the plan.
card status. The recent lifting of these limits
permits any number of applicants and their
family members from any country to be admit-
ted, up to the annual cap of 140,000. Green
card applications by nationals of some coun-
tries are therefore likely to expand rapidly.
However, the lifting of country limits is only
part of a larger issue. Of a year’s cohort of
195,000 new H-1B workers, at least 100,000 are
likely to seek permanent residency. They and
their family members will constitute about
160,000 green card applicants, well in excess
of the current 140,000 limit on permanent
employment visas.72  Furthermore, these H-1B
applicants are only one component of the glo-
bal applicant pool for these 140,000 visas. The
inevitable result will be far too many applicants
seeking too few green cards. This will frustrate
applicants and employers, create incentives for
visa overstay, increase possibilities for exploita-
tion of workers, and intensify the administra-
tive problems discussed below.
Our growing reliance on temporary visas
also introduces rigidities into the labor mar-
ket. Although AC21 improves portability of the
H-1B visa between employers, it does not re-
solve the long-standing problem that H-1B
workers seeking permanent residence are ef-
fectively tied to the employer sponsoring their
green card through the lengthy certification
process. While the position awaits certification
with DOL, workers find it difficult to switch
jobs or negotiate for higher wages. Competing
employers may be disadvantaged, innovation72. Lowell (2000: Table 4).
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may be stifled, and competing domestic work-
ers may face intensified downward wage pres-
sures.73
A BROKEN IMMIGRATION
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Problems with the procedures discussed thus
far are compounded by poor implementation
by the agencies charged with administering
U.S. immigration policy. The full extent of all
of the problems cannot be described here; they
date back decades and are the substance of
legend.74
The INS has consistently been rated among
the worst performing agencies in the federal
government. It has repeatedly been the target
of critical reports from the General Account-
ing Office and the Department of Justice In-
spector General’s Office. Reports have critically
evaluated its enforcement efforts at the border
and in the interior, naturalization programs,
management of human resources, information
systems and statistical collection, financial sys-
tems and accountability, and, indeed, almost
all its major functions. Despite INS’s improve-
ment efforts, Government Executive’s 1999 Re-
port Card ranked it as one of the worst managed
federal agencies; the report card included “D’s”
for financial management and human re-
sources.75
Growing Backlogs. Waiting lists are necessar-
ily created when there are too many applicants
for numerically restricted classes of admission.
However, cumbersome procedures and inad-
equate management structures have created
backlogs for a host of other functions. As appli-
cations rise in the face of management bottle-
necks, the number of people affected, and the
uncertainty and burdens they face, rise as well.
Here are just a few of the most noteworthy
examples of immigration backlogs:
• Waiting Lists. Numerical caps on classes of
admission necessarily create queues of ap-
plicants for a limited number of slots. The
place in the queue is determined by time of
application. Spouses of legal aliens currently
wait from four to seven years. Brothers and
sisters wait 11 years on average—up to 21
years for the Chinese. The employment wait-
ing list is mostly current, except for Chinese
and Indian applicants, but the recent AC21
legislation may change this.76  The last avail-
able data indicate that in 1997 there were
3.6 million individuals on the various wait-
ing lists.77
• Adjustment Backlogs. After clearing the wait-
ing list, immigrants who have applied for
green cards from within the United States
must be formally “adjusted” to permanent
residence status. A decade ago, about
100,000 people were in this technical back-
log, but today over one million are caught
in this situation, which can last over three
years. (See discussion below.)
• Naturalizations. After five years in the United
States, legal permanent residents become
eligible for citizenship. A surge in applica-
tions in the early to mid-1990s overwhelmed
INS’s processing capacity, and this backlog
grew to 1.8 million with waits up to 28
months. However, recent management
changes have helped to standardize natu-
ralization requirements, improve the qual-
ity of background checks, and reduce the
time from application to final swearing in.78
• Permanent Labor Certification and Petitions. In
the 1970s and 1980s it was possible to ob-
tain an employment-based visa in less than
one and one-half years. As noted above, the
wait now is at least two to three years, with
many delays running much longer. DOL
can take up to four years to certify an em-
ployer to hire a foreign worker, while INS
73. Robinson (2000).
74. Morris (1985).
75. Government Executive (2000: 96-97).
76. Bureau of Consular Affairs (2000).
77. Visa Office (2000).
78. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2000b).
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can take up to a year to approve a foreign
worker’s petition.79
• Temporary H-1B Attestations and Petitions. The
law requires DOL to approve an employer’s
attestation for hiring an H-1B foreign worker
in seven working days, but the time required
by INS to process the subsequent petition
has increased from about one to four
months. AC21, which raised the annual cap
by 70 percent and eased portability restric-
tions, will likely increase the volume of peti-
tions and produce even further delays.80
The growth of the green card “adjustment”
backlogs during the late 1990s provides a dra-
matic example of management problems at
the INS. Adjustment backlogs grew due to poor
anticipation of surging demand for green cards,
a lack of manpower, misdirection of user fees
to the processing of other functions, and oth-
erwise ineffective administration.
In most instances, adjustment is simply a
paperwork process that finalizes the individual’s
status as a permanent resident. Employment-
based green card applicants often fall into this
backlog as they attempt to transfer their status
from temporary working visas of one type or
another. While final adjustment is pending,
the immigrant is stuck in limbo, with reduced
rights and the need to file annually for exten-
sions of stay. Technical considerations can cre-
ate hardship for some or delay family
reunification for others. The AC21 legislation
makes it easier for some individuals to get an-
nual reauthorizations, but unless the adjust-
ment backlog is cleared, the number of persons
caught in this backlog will continue to grow.
Figure 9 shows the rapid growth in total
adjustment backlogs for family, employment,
and refugee classes over the past decade. As
noted below, this backlog grew tenfold during
the 1990s, from 100,000 to over one million, as
agency-wide INS problems mounted. At least
200,000 of these individuals are likely seeking
employment-based visas. Waits for final adjust-
ment to legal permanent residency now take
from three months to almost four years, de-
pending upon which local INS office is in-
volved.81
The adjustment backlog accounts in part
for the failure to grant the full complement of
140,000 employment-based visas allowed by law.
For instance, in 1998 only 77,517 of the 140,000
visas were used.82  This shortfall, of course, does
not signify a lack of demand. Cumbersome
regulations and administrative inefficiencies
SOURCE: Unpublished INS statistics branch data, October
2000. Data represent a sum of persons in the regular, refugee
and asylum adjustment backlog from September of each given
year; Data for FY2000: Office of Policy and Planning, U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service. “Monthly Statistical
Report, September 2000 FY Year End Report.” October 31,
2000. www.ins.usdoj.gov.
Figure 9
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79. National Research Council (2000: 5.2.2, 5-6); Shusterman
(2000).
80. Committee for Economic Development (2001).
81. Siskand, Susser Hass & Divine (2000).
82. Shusterman (2001).
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have kept half of the available visas out of the
hands of eligible applicants. Many of these ap-
plicants are in the INS adjustment backlog;
others await DOL certification. In some cases,
the permanent certification process has taken
longer than the six-year duration of stay granted
to H-1B workers, and the visaholders have had
to pull up stakes and return home.
The adjustment backlog is partly due to a
significant increase in green card applications
that outpaced the INS systems. But poor INS
administration has compounded the problem.
Indeed, improvements in processing time for
one program have often come at the expense
of others. For example, when applications for
naturalization surged in the mid-1990s, pro-
cessing delays grew from six months to as much
as two years. In many cases paperwork was mis-
placed or simply lost, sometimes requiring an
individual to start the entire process again. In
response, administrative reforms and more per-
sonnel were employed to reduce the process-
ing time for naturalizations, but at the expense
of longer backlogs for other services, including
the processing of permanent employment
visas.
These problems are related to the dilemma
of user fees at the INS. The agency has long
been empowered to collect user fees for vari-
ous services, which currently range from $6 to
$1000, but they have faced two major prob-
lems.83  First, the fees are not tied to funding
the services provided. Thus, when demands for
naturalization rose, fees were redirected there
at the expense of other services.84  Second, the
typically small fees often do not cover the ac-
tual cost of services. The meager $115 fee for a
permanent employment visa does not nearly
cover current processing costs, and certainly
provides no resources for meaningful reduc-
tions in processing time. The Government Ac-
counting Office (GAO) has evaluated the
structure of INS user fees and concludes that
the fees do not appear to cover costs, but that
the INS is unable to assess costs because it does
not have the data necessary to calculate costs
accurately.85
Broad Agreement on Sources of the Problem. Over
the past century 33 organizations have made
recommendations to restructure the manage-
ment of immigration.86  (See Appendix C:
Organization Chart of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.) Various management
reforms have been launched at the INS—at
least three in the last decade alone. Neverthe-
less, in 1999 the GAO offered a bleak assess-
ment of INS’s progress in addressing its
management and program challenges.87  Their
critique found deficiencies in strategic plan-
ning, organizational structure, communications
and coordination, and financial management.
Two recent reports have made comprehen-
sive recommendations for reorganizing the INS.
The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
(the Jordan Commission) and the Carnegie
Endowment issued recommendations in 1997
and 1998 respectively. While their recommen-
dations differ markedly, they agree on some
fundamental reasons for the continuing fail-
ure of INS management.88
• Massive Growth in Workloads and Failure in
Service. The Immigration Act of 1990 in-
creased the limit on permanent admissions
by 40 percent and set the stage for rapid
growth in temporary visas. As a result, de-
mand for INS services surged. Then, in 1996
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act charged the INS
with a number of new enforcement mis-
sions, from deportations to border inspec-
tions. Although INS personnel has grown
from about 21,000 in 1995 to about 32,000
today, and its budget from $2.2 billion to
83. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2000c); U.S.
General Accounting Office (1994).
84. U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (1997: 193).
85. U.S. General Accounting Office (1998: 8-10).
86. Papademetriou, Aleinikoff, and Meyers (1998: 55-59).
87. U.S. General Accounting Office (1999).
88. U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (1997);
Papademetriou, Aleinikoff, and Meyers (1998).
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nearly $5 billion, overload remains a prob-
lem.89
Congressional appropriations go primarily
to enforcement, while visa processing and other
services depend substantially on funding from
fees. Poor customer service frustrates everyone
involved, sets the wrong tone for future citi-
zens, and creates a self-reinforcing negative
culture among INS personnel, who become
indifferent to constant complaints. Analysts
have recommended that user fees be set to
reflect true costs and used to cover the services
for which the fees are levied, and that a cus-
tomer service orientation be inculcated within
the agency.
• Conflict between Enforcement and Services at the
INS. Most analysts have argued that INS
administration suffers because it tries to com-
bine enforcement and service functions.
(Enforcement functions include border con-
trol, checks on work authorization, and de-
portations. Service functions include pro-
cessing green card and other visa applicants
and later processing aliens to become natu-
ralized citizens.) These disparate functions
fall under the same executive office at the
INS. The border enforcement mentality con-
flicts sharply with a culture of providing visa
services and may also divert scarce resources.
Recommendations invariably call for the
separate administration of INS’s enforce-
ment and service functions.
• Lack of Accountability. The Carnegie Endow-
ment report distinguished between exter-
nal and internal accountability.90  In rela-
tion to the former, it singled out problems
with INS’s relationship with Congress, which
has often been acrimonious.91  Frustration
with INS failures has led Congress to
micromanage instead of relying on INS man-
agement. The Jordan Commission called
for Congress to set more manageable and
fully funded priorities. As to internal ac-
countability, the Jordan Commission and
Carnegie agreed that the accountability of
managers must be increased. INS managers
are rarely held accountable for poor ser-
vices or for tolerating enforcement prac-
tices that violate agency policies. It was rec-
ommended that managers be sanctioned
for noncompliance, that innovation should
be rewarded, and that the recruitment and
training of managers be improved.
• Poor Information Systems. Timely and accu-
rate information is required for both effec-
tive administration and the production of
statistics. Problems with data collection and
management of information technology
(IT) pervade all functions of INS. GAO has
criticized the agency for weaknesses in its IT
systems, as well as for poor management of
efforts to improve them.92  The problem is
well illustrated by the consistently late re-
lease of the INS Statistical Yearbook; the 1998
edition was released in November 2000. This
information shortage persisted even while
Congress was making changes in immigra-
tion policy. It is difficult to identify all the
reasons for the failure of INS data systems,
but it is clear that automation alone will not
resolve the problem. The National Acad-
emy of Sciences (NAS), in describing the
criteria for a successful statistical system,
places a high priority on the independence
of the statistical function. The GAO con-
cluded that the INS’s Statistics Branch is
not independent as NAS defines the term.93
The Jordan and Carnegie reports call for a
statistical branch established by statute as a
separate entity, headed by a career civil ser-
vant, and able to release data on a predeter-
mined schedule without approval of more
senior managers.
89. U.S. Department of Justice (2000); U.S. General Accounting
Office (2001: 14-15).
90. Papademetriou, Aleinikoff, and Meyers (1998: 28-29).
91. Gimpel and Edwards (1999).
92. U.S. General Accounting Office (2000b, 2000d).
93. The National Academy of Sciences (1992: 1-8); U.S. General
Accounting Office (1998b); Lowell and Martin (1999).
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• Multiple Agencies Without a Central Policy Struc-
ture. A variety of agencies have responsibil-
ity for immigration functions. The INS has
most day-to-day tasks in the enforcement
and service functions, the State Department
issues visas abroad and handles most refu-
gee issues, the Labor Department processes
certifications and attestations and helps
enforce workplace rules, and the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services man-
ages refugee resettlement with the aid of
state and non-governmental organizations.
Yet none of these players has a major voice
in policy formulation, nor is there a central
location and formal structure for policy de-
velopment. In some areas, such as legal
admissions, several agencies are involved in
part of the function.
The Jordan Commission recommended a
complete restructuring of the U.S. immigra-
tion system, with the INS enforcement func-
tion to be allocated to Justice; the INS services
and benefits functions going to State; its ap-
peals unit going to an Agency for Immigration
Review; and all labor standards being adminis-
tered by the Labor Department.94  On the other
hand, the Carnegie Endowment argued that
all of these functions should ideally be consoli-
dated into a Cabinet level agency, befitting the
critical national role of immigration. If that
were infeasible, Carnegie recommended that
an Associate Attorney General at the Depart-
ment of Justice head immigration, with en-
forcement and services functions administered
separately.
Recent Reorganization Proposals. Congress is
well aware of the growth of backlogs and other
processing problems at the INS, as well as suc-
cessive problems in carrying out its enforce-
ment function. While the INS has made
improvements in some areas in recent years, it
remains hampered in meeting its multiple mis-
sions by an inherently flawed administrative
structure. For the most part, Congress appears
to have accepted the widely held view that the
INS’s enforcement and service functions should
be separated, and that the policy authority of
immigration should be elevated.
Three major pieces of legislation have been
introduced recently for Congressional consid-
eration. The “Immigration Reform and Im-
provement Act of 1999” would split the INS
into two separate agencies within the Depart-
ment of Justice, one devoted to enforcement
and the other to service. The “INS Reform and
Border Security Act of 1999” would create a
new Immigration Affairs Agency within the DOJ
and would give it authority over both enforce-
ment and service. Finally, the “Immigration
Restructuring and Accountability Act of 1999”
would create a National Immigration Bureau
(NIB) within the DOJ and would establish sepa-
rate NIB divisions for adjudications, enforce-
ment and detention. In addition, the new
Bush Administration is expected to offer a pro-
posal to separate the enforcement and service
activities.
FAILURE TO CONTROL
ILLEGAL MIGRATION
Although this policy statement is directed
principally at the legal immigration system, we
would be remiss if we did not comment on
illegal immigration, which is a major source of
very low-skill labor. As noted above, illegal im-
migration adds an estimated 100,000-300,000
persons (net) to the population each year.
About five million persons now reside in the
United States illegally, some of whom have
been here for years or even decades.95  U.S.
employment opportunities are a powerful lure
for illegal migrants, since U.S. wages are roughly
eight times higher than those in Mexico or
other Central American countries, and efforts
to seal off the borders have not been very suc-
cessful.
94. U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (1997: 147-181). 95. Warren (2000: 3); Smith and Edmonston (1997: 51-52).
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Since World War II, agriculture in particu-
lar has become dependent upon a ready sup-
ply of seasonal workers, many of them
unauthorized. Illegal workers also can be found
outside of agriculture in a variety of non-du-
rable manufacturing and service sector jobs, in
rural, suburban, and urban settings. Here too,
many employers have become dependent on
low-paid, unauthorized workers. We do not
underestimate the difficulty of this problem.
The wage differentials involved provide a pow-
erful magnet to attract immigrants as well as a
powerful temptation for employers to reduce
costs.
Policies to control illegal migration and their
enforcement have a long and difficult history
in the United States. Policies have wavered be-
tween attempts at unequivocal crackdowns and
a remarkable degree of tolerance. Because
employers, wittingly or not, create the demand
for illegal migrants, the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 instituted em-
ployer sanctions that require employers to keep
records on work-authorizing identification pre-
sented by new employees.96  Fines can be levied
for failure to comply, although extremely few
have been pursued in practice and enforce-
ment of these sanctions has further eased in
recent years.97
In the meantime, attempts to monitor the
border more effectively have not notably re-
duced illegal entries. Even if border enforce-
ment were more effective, however, such
controls would not exclude those illegal immi-
grants who have overstayed their temporary
visas. As a result, and as we note in our recom-
mendations, authorized work status is a labor
force standard that is necessary, in conjunction
with other approaches, to reduce illegal immi-
gration.
Illegal workers are often exploited as a re-
sult of their vulnerable status and accept low
wages that undercut those of domestic work-
ers. Likewise, unscrupulous employers who
knowingly hire unauthorized workers under-
cut their competitors and create serious equity
problems for native workers.98  We recognize
that many unauthorized workers have labored
hard, have contributed greatly to the benefit of
many, and are often an integral part of Ameri-
can families. But a system that encourages a
cynical disregard for the law is not in the na-
tional interest. As the next chapter argues, we
should begin to close the backdoor to unau-
thorized employment and open the front door
wider to legal workers.
98. LeDuff (2000)96. As a complementary action, IRCA conferred permanent
legal status (amnesty) on unauthorized residents who had been
in the United States since before 1982 or who had worked in
agricultural occupations during the mid-1980’s.  IRCA ultimately
legalized about 2.7 million illegal residents.
97. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act attempted to crack down on illegal immigration
by enhancing border enforcement, as well as by making it more
difficult for illegal immigrants to adjust to legal status.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM
Immigration has major social and economic
effects on the United States, especially in areas
where immigrants are concentrated. Immigra-
tion policy will decide, whether explicitly or by
default, which prospective immigrants we will
admit.  This decision will reflect not only
social and economic considerations, but also
our values.
We fully support the family and humanitar-
ian commitments of today’s immigration poli-
cies. We believe, however, that these policies
give insufficient weight to the importance of
education and skills in determining the success
and contribution of new arrivals. Current im-
migration policies are more influenced by the
interests of individual groups than by our com-
mon public interest in economic growth and
broadly shared economic opportunity.
CED also believes strongly that major and
comprehensive reform of the U.S. immigra-
tion system will be required to avoid escalating
problems in the future. We believe it is essen-
tial to create a system that has legitimacy in the
eyes of its stakeholders—a system that is fair
and efficient, with rules that are consistently
applied. An efficient system should aim to pro-
cess visas in weeks, not months or years.
Our recommendations for revitalizing the
system are designed to address, in an integrated
fashion, the serious problems identified in
Chapters 1 and 2. We recognize that this will
not be easy to accomplish, but the price of
inaction will be greater administrative failure,
a less productive economy, and the movement
of many of today’s legal immigrants into illegal
status.
Congress and the Administration should act
now to broaden the skill base of immigrants,
restructure the  administration of immigration,
rationalize the admission of permanent and
temporary workers, and create mechanisms to
design and implement flexible policies. The
system should emphasize skills as well as imme-
diate family reunification and humanitarian
admissions.
BROADEN THE SKILL BASE
CED recommends broadening the skill base
of immigration by increasing the number of
skill-based employment visas relative to other
visa categories. The visas allocated to immedi-
ate family members need not be reduced, but
more skills should be required of small, se-
lected classes of admission that currently have
few or no skill requirements. More employ-
ment-based admissions would not only provide
greater skills immediately, but would also seed
future family immigration networks with more
highly skilled sponsors.
The number of permanent employment-
based visas should be approximately doubled
by either (1) increasing the cap, or (2) counting
only visa principals towards the cap.  Currently,
the principal immigrant, spouse, and children
are all counted towards the annual cap of
140,000. Either approach can be defended.
Simply increasing the overall cap has historic
precedence. Not counting the spouse and chil-
dren of the principal against the cap would
effectively double the number of principal im-
migrants admitted. This second approach has
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the further advantage that adjustments in the
cap would have a more concrete meaning in
terms of employment, since it would no longer
include an unknown number of nuclear family
members.
CED does not recommend reducing the nu-
merical limits on the core family-based classes
of admission. The rationale for family-based
immigration is to reunify family members. Fur-
ther, family-based adult immigrants have on
average at least a high school education, and
most have at least modest success in the labor
market.
We recommend raising skill requirements
for the “special” EB-3, siblings and adult chil-
dren, and diversity classes.  In particular, we
recommend converting the 10,000 EB-3 visas
that require no skills into skilled EB-3 visas,
which require a bachelors degree or higher. In
addition, siblings and adult children admitted
under family sponsorship should be required
to have at least a college degree.* Likewise, we
recommend requiring a college degree in the
diversity lottery category, which currently re-
quires no employer sponsorship and only a
high school education. With these changes,
these admission classes will begin to generate
networks of skilled sponsors that will produce
additional skilled family-based immigrants in
the future.
We also recommend that Congress restore
a flexible individual country limit for perma-
nent employment-based immigrants. Such a
flexible cap would have a higher individual
country limit, perhaps 10-15 percent.  If this
limit were reached, nationals of the country
would remain eligible, but preference would
be given to under represented countries and
graduates of U.S. institutions. In recent years,
there have been far more employment-based
applicants from countries such as India and
China than could be accommodated by the 7
percent per country caps. As noted in Chapter
2, Congress recently lifted these caps. CED
supports this action because of extreme labor
market tightness and the need to clear current
adjustment backlogs.
Without country caps, however, a very few
countries will eventually dominate employment-
based immigration and even family-based ad-
missions. Hiring networks that are dominated
by several countries discourage a global search
for the best and the brightest employees and
are unfair to applicants from other, underrep-
resented nations. Flexible caps would encour-
age diversity and equitable opportunity, but
without turning away qualified applicants if
the full allocation of employment visas remains
unused.
After individual country limits are reached,
the system should give priority to immigrants
from underrepresented countries. Next in pri-
ority should be those U.S.-educated immigrants
in whom America has invested (regardless of
country of origin). Large numbers of foreign
students earn advanced degrees in leading U.S.
graduate schools of science and engineering.
These highly skilled individuals are a national
resource. They have a U.S. education, a head
start on English proficiency, and familiarity
with our society and culture. Most are, in short,
ideal candidates for green cards, and any coun-
try limitations should be flexible enough to
give them priority.99
CED supports the principle that legal au-
thorization to work is an essential labor stan-
dard, but recognizes that the effective reduction
of unauthorized employment requires a com-
prehensive approach that addresses the funda-
mental causes of the problem. We believe such
a standard is required to make any temporary
employment visa programs function effectively
and, most important, to ensure consistent and
fair labor market conditions for employers and
domestic workers.
We recognize, however, that the forces driv-
ing illegal immigration for work run deep and
99. Congress should also consider directing the INS to reinstate
a two-year period of work authorization for post-graduation “prac-
tical training” for “F” foreign students.  The INS revised the
program to a one-year period over a decade ago to complement
a no longer existing off-campus work program.  A two-year
period would allow time for testing period and a transition to
permanency while lowering demand for H-1B visas.
*See memorandum by MARTIN B. ZIMMERMAN (page 46).
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are entrenched in parts of our economy. It
would be naïve to expect employers to be the
only barrier to the employment of unautho-
rized workers. We therefore believe that addi-
tional, complementary approaches also will be
required to significantly reduce illegal immi-
gration—economic development abroad, safer
and more effective border enforcement, the
channeling of legitimate demand for workers
into legal immigration programs, and more
effective and less intrusive mechanisms to verify
work status.
As part of this approach, current laws that
bar unauthorized workers from U.S. employ-
ment should be kept on the books, and new
mechanisms that are reliable and simplify com-
pliance should be piloted and implemented.
Employers have a responsibility to comply with
the requirement that their employees are au-
thorized to work in the United States (the “em-
ployer sanctions” law). At the same time, CED
notes that the cumbersome “I-9” document/
identification check is susceptible to fraud and
may lead some employers to inadvertently dis-
criminate against foreign-appearing persons.
The current system lacks reliability and trans-
parency, making it very difficult to determine
worker status.
Recommendations that would make em-
ployer sanctions workable without relying on a
national identification card have been made,
but not effectively followed.100  In particular,
the INS and the Social Security Administration
have pilot work authorization programs that
crosscheck an individual’s name with a valid
Social Security number. In most cases these
checks are reliable. When either the name or
Social Security number does not check out,
the individual is provided an opportunity to
explain the discrepancy. This simple check per-
mits unauthorized workers to be quickly iden-
tified without requiring the employer or worker
to be subjected to unreliable (and potentially
fraudulent) document checks, and some em-
ployers are now volunteering for these pilot
programs. However, because these programs
continue to impose the burdensome I-9 re-
quirements, we recommend that a full evalua-
tion without these requirements be undertaken.
Other proposals to improve the efficacy of
sanctions include improved methods of identi-
fication and enforcement. This is not the place
to review the list of possible innovations. How-
ever, we are convinced that new and sophisti-
cated information technology can make
effective and reliable law enforcement possible.
We must mobilize the political will to do so.
Finally, CED urges employers to act in ways
that discourage the employment of unautho-
rized workers. Where possible, employers
should apply greater scrutiny to their contrac-
tors’ employment practices and voluntarily cre-
ate inspection mechanisms and enter into
monitoring agreements. Employers should not
recruit illegal workers in the United States or
in other countries, exploit workers’ question-
able legal status to pay sub-market wages, or
threaten workers who attempt to unionize.
Widespread observance of these principles
would deter illegal migration by reducing the
demand for unauthorized workers, thereby
helping to protect wages and working condi-
tions for native workers and to establish an
equitable labor market environment for U.S.
employers.
RESTRUCTURE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF
IMMIGRATION
We call on Congress and the new Adminis-
tration to move quickly to reform the manage-
ment of immigration. We applaud the new
Administration for making this reform a high
priority, and Congress should act immediately
on proposals to comprehensively restructure
the management of immigration within and
across agencies. Piecemeal reforms of the ad-
ministration of immigration have been inad-
equate, and a state of crisis now exists at the
INS. Credible proposals outside and within100. U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (1997: 103-125).
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Congress have long existed. They range from a
separation of enforcement and service func-
tions, to a redistribution of functions across
various agencies, to a consolidation of all func-
tions at the INS. CED believes that any success-
ful reform must separate enforcement from
services to ensure the effectiveness and ac-
countability of these two different management
functions. Such a separation would also pro-
mote a consumer-oriented approach to service
delivery. Adding functions such as an ombuds-
man will help create a responsive organization.
In addition, effective reform should con-
solidate and elevate the authority and
policymaking capacity of senior immigration
officials. We are strongly sympathetic to the
proposals of the Carnegie Endowment to ac-
complish this, whether through the creation of
a new, independent agency or the elevation of
the immigration function within the Depart-
ment of Justice.101
Along with the major task of restructuring
the management of immigration on an organi-
zational level, CED believes that two additional
changes should accompany such an effort:
The INS and other agencies should collect
user fees that at least cover the full costs of
services and that can be used only to fund
delivery and improvement of those services.
User fees must not be allocated to pay for
other agency functions, and the agencies must
be held accountable, issuing regular perfor-
mance reports to Congressional oversight com-
mittees. For example, the revenues from
employment visa fees must be dedicated to
program functions related to the delivery of
employment visa services. In addition, the fees
must be sufficient to fund efficient program
delivery. The agencies involved, with audits by
a third party, should generate an internal ac-
counting of costs and estimates of appropriate
fees.
We believe that employers will be willing to
pay substantial fees if they are assured that they
can obtain permanent or temporary foreign
workers quickly and efficiently without admin-
istrative bottlenecks. (See box, “User Fees at
the Food and Drug Administration.”) At
present, employers pay large explicit and im-
plicit costs in obtaining foreign workers. The
U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform esti-
mated that the average costs of labor certifica-
tion alone, including advertising, legal
expenses, and administrative fees, averaged
$7,500 to $10,000 per worker.102  We recom-
mend that burdensome and time-consuming
certification requirements for permanent em-
ployees be replaced with a faster system of
attestation. While we cannot specify exactly how
large fees should be, because they differ ac-
cording to service and no public cost estimates
exist, we believe that user fees fully covering
the costs of worker admissions might be as
high as $5,000-$10,000.103
The INS and other agencies should also
explore privatizing some immigration functions
in which the private sector has a demonstrated
capacity, such as the verification and process-
ing of visa applications.  In other public activi-
ties it has been demonstrated that, in a variety
of cases and settings, public goals can be
achieved effectively and efficiently through pri-
vate means. Examples include service delivery
(in some elements of welfare reform), enforce-
ment (the Department of Justice’s Civil Debt
Collection program), and evaluation (the wide-
spread use of private firms to perform pro-
gram evaluation for federal and state agencies).
We have little doubt that this would prove to be
an attractive activity for many businesses.
RATIONALIZE THE ADMISSION
OF PERMANENT WORKERS
CED recommends that employer certifica-
tion for employment-based admissions should
101. Papademetriou, Aleinikoff, and Meyers (1998: Chapter 7).
102. U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (1995: 112).
103. A new Premium Processing Program at the INS is to be
initiated in 2001 to provide expedited (15 day) processing of visa
petitions for an additional fee of $1,000.  At the time of this
writing it is unclear which visas the program will cover or what
relationship this fee might have to processing costs.
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be replaced by an attestation, coupled with
random audits.  An effective permanent em-
ployment admissions system must process visas
in weeks not years. It must ensure a fair process
for applicants, employers, and domestic work-
ers. The reformed system should include a B2G
(business-to-government) Internet application
process, computerized check of the applica-
tion form, and a random audit of successful
applicants. The user fees recommended above
would provide the resources. As noted in Chap-
ter 2, DOL is currently moving to improve its
process along these lines, but DOL’s reforms
in the past have sometimes been marked by
delays or piecemeal implementation.
The attestation should include affirmation
of all the items in the current attestation for
temporary H-1B workers, including that there
are no strikes, lockouts, or similar job actions
at intended places of employment and that a
notice or a copy of each application has been
conspicuously posted at such places of employ-
ment. In addition, petitioning employers should
be required to affirm that they have tried to
recruit similarly qualified domestic workers;
that they intend to pay the immigrant the pre-
vailing wage; and that they have not and will
not displace similarly qualified domestic work-
ers in order to hire foreign workers.
User fees recently have been widely adopted
and used effectively at the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA). Prior to 1992, FDA’s drug
review process was in a state similar to that of the
INS today. Staff shortages, limited resources, and
an increasing number of applications left the
FDA and the industry facing review backlogs and
an approval period approaching two years.104
The Administration as well as industry groups,
including the Pharmaceutical Research Manufac-
turers of America, suggested user fees as a means
of alleviating system pressures.105  In 1992, Con-
gress passed the Prescription Drug User Fee Act
(PDUFA), which provided for the funding of 600
additional reviewers through user fees, and later
extended its authorization until FY 2002 through
the Food and Drug Administration Moderniza-
tion Act of 1997.106
Despite the costs that PDUFA user fees im-
posed on approximately 175 companies (from
$128,000 to $256,000 each in FY2000), the indus-
try was generally supportive on the condition
that the fees would:
• supplement existing appropriations;
• be dedicated to review;
• be reasonable; and
USER FEES AT THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
• be based on a long-term government com-
mitment to improving the review process.107
A spokesperson for the Biotechnology Indus-
try Organization noted that the industry would
support user fees as long as the money was used
to speed drug approvals, but “not pay the elec-
tric bill.”108  An expedited review process allows
companies to more quickly release products to
the market and recoup upfront review costs.
Since implementation of FDA user fees, review times
have been cut in half, approval rates have increased,
and drug development times have decreased, all of
which have generated substantial economic and health
benefits.109
FDA user fees are assessed twice in the review
process. Fifty percent is due upon submission of
an application and 50 percent is due upon re-
ceipt of an “action letter” (approval, corrections
necessary, or denial). Fees on certain applica-
tions qualify for waivers, deferrals and reduc-
tions. These include fees that present a
“significant” barrier to innovation, where the fee
exceeds the review cost, or when the product is
similar to already approved drugs. Also, busi-
nesses with fewer than 500 employees and no
prescription products on the market are charged
one-half the normal user fee.
104. Henkel (1995).
105. Henkel (1995).
106. Food and Drug Administration (1999).
107. Henkel (1995); Federal Register (1999).
108. Neergaard (1997).
109. Food and Drug Administration (1999).
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Following approval of the attestations and
immigrant petitions, a small random enforce-
ment program should audit employers and visa
holders during the first year of employment.
Accountability should not be sacrificed to the
goal of timely and less intrusive visa processing.
Critics have questioned whether attestation is
sufficient to ensure that domestic workers are
not harmed by the importation of green card
workers. Problems with fraud and exploitation
have been discovered with attestations, par-
ticularly in the temporary H-1B program. The
Government Accounting Office (GAO) has
brought to light a small number of serious
infractions on the part of employers who do
not comply with their attestations. Likewise,
the GAO has found fraudulent claims by some
foreign workers with respect to their education
and skills. Deceit and fraud, involving however
small a portion of incoming workers, can un-
dermine trust in the system, and businesses
should therefore recognize that employment
audits are essential to its integrity. These audits
should cover both permanent and temporary
work-related visas and both employers and visa
holders. The audits should be as non-intrusive
as possible, and procedures should take advan-
tage of existing information when appropriate.
In the event that an audit or complaint
indicates an inaccurate attestation, penalties
against employers for back pay and other viola-
tions should be assessed. Visa violators should
face monetary penalties and possible deporta-
tion. Those responsible for this enforcement
activity must have consistent guidelines and
adequate staff and other resources. Attestations
and user fees together can deliver a timely,
market-responsive visa system, and a small au-
dit program will ensure the integrity of the
system.
RATIONALIZE THE ADMISSION
OF TEMPORARY WORKERS
The Specialty Worker (H-1B) visa should be
thoroughly reformed. The system should be
more flexible in responding to market condi-
tions. The visa should be genuinely temporary,
with a three-year term. The worker should
demonstrate intent to return home just as other
temporary visa holders do.  While the recent
AC21 legislation has made important improve-
ments, CED believes that more fundamental
reform is required. Our recommendations for
improving the permanent employment system
and those for the temporary system are an
integrated package; repair of both is required
to make either system function effectively.
A flexible H-1B program would, to some
degree, adjust the supply of high-skill labor to
meet legitimate employer demands as they re-
spond to changes in economic conditions. Such
flexibility can be achieved only if the H-1B is a
genuinely temporary visa, not an implied six-
year visa serving as the escape valve for a dys-
functional permanent visa system. Our present
system, which confounds temporary and per-
manent status, creates unrealistic expectations
for both workers and employers and promotes
public cynicism. This makes it difficult to man-
age an effective permanent visa system and
creates administrative and political barriers to
adjusting immigration levels.
A genuinely temporary H-1B visa would not
mean that workers could not apply for perma-
nent resident status. But we envision a system
in which green card processing takes place in
weeks and becomes the visa of preference for
employers and workers. In such circumstances,
an employer can “try out” an H-1B for two
years or more before deciding whether to spon-
sor the worker as a permanent employee. Simi-
larly, H-1B workers would not be tied to a
single employer by long processing delays. An
effective system will harmonize temporary and
permanent visas without creating unrealistic
expectations. It must be made explicit that an
H-1B visa is not an entitlement to permanent
residency.
An auction program to allocate additional
H-1B visas should be created. This would pro-
vide a market test of employer demand and
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would be implemented if the number of H-1B
petitions received exceeded the statutory cap.
(See box, “How Auctions Work.”) The core
H-1B program would allocate a fixed number
of visas to be determined by Congress every
three years. However, because Congressional
action is ill suited to provide a timely response
when economic conditions change, a market
mechanism should be instituted to allocate an
additional allotment of visas during periods of
extraordinary demand. This “safety valve” would
allow the statutory cap to be set at a level that is
less likely to produce an oversupply when the
demand for skilled workers weakens. There
are many ways in which such an auction might
work. One possibility would be a quarterly auc-
tion, with the number of visas in a given lot
determined by an advisory board. (See recom-
mendation below.) A private sector firm might
be placed under contract to conduct the auc-
tion.
The auction provides a market mechanism
to allocate visas to those industries and firms
where skilled labor is at a premium and would
be most productive. Existing prevailing wage
attestations, subject to random audit, would
apply to auction visas. However, visas obtained
through auction would not be subject to other
attestation requirements, since auction costs
should provide adequate incentives for employ-
ers to seek out domestic labor. Employers would
tender the bids, and, as with the current law for
petition fees, foreign workers could not be
charged directly with the cost of the auction or
other hiring costs incurred by the employer.110
The H-1B visa should be portable among
employers. Portability creates a more flexible
and efficient labor market and also helps pro-
tect both H-1B and domestic workers regard-
ing wages and working conditions. While
recently enacted provisions of AC21 increase
nominal portability, those provisions do not
HOW AUCTIONS WORK
Auctions would provide a market-based allo-
cation of temporary visas and channel human
capital to its most productive use in our
economy. Auctions have been used effectively
not only in the private sector, but by govern-
ment as well. For example, auctions have been
used by the Treasury Department to sell Trea-
sury bills, by the FCC to sell Radio Spectrum
Licenses, and by the EPA to allocate Pollution
Certificates. Significant economic research also
supports their effectiveness.111
The chief goal of this proposal is to allocate
visas in a manner that maximizes their contribu-
tion to the economy. Bids would be a measure
of the value each prospective employer places
on additional skilled labor relative to other
employers; the highest bids would reflect the
most productive employment of immigrant
workers. The auction might also serve as a safety
valve in years when the ceilings have been
reached on the regular visa programs.
Auctions could also provide a market-based
mechanism for adjusting immigration levels
incrementally from year to year. Visas allot-
ments could be increased or decreased based
on the previous year’s demand (reflected in bid
levels). This would be a much less onerous
mechanism than the current system, which
requires legislative action for any adjustments.
Even if levels were not tied automatically to the
auction, it would at least provide important
information about the labor market that would
be of great use to policymakers. (See recom-
mendations below regarding flexible policies.)
If one agrees that at least some visas should
be allocated in response to employment needs
in the economy, there is little reason to oppose
auctions in principle. Employers and immi-
grants already bear costs (filing and legal fees,
compliance costs) in obtaining visas. Auctions
would not only allocate employment visas more
efficiently, but significant auction bid costs
would provide a signal and incentive for em-
ployers to pursue the hiring and training of
domestic workers more aggressively.
111. See McAfee and McMillan (1987); Congressional Budget
Office (1992); Das and Sundaram (1997).
110.  In practice, employers would be free to make contractual
arrangements with workers to reflect such costs, including the
risk of having the worker later “pirated” by another employer.
Such arrangements would become a normal part of the labor
market encompassing the auction.
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address the “lock in” of green card applicants,
the major cause of worker immobility. Our
recommendations for streamlining green card
processing by restructuring the immigration
bureaucracy and funding efficient administra-
tion with user fees directly attack that basic
problem.
Following reforms to the permanent em-
ployment system, the H-1B visa can meet genu-
inely temporary needs, for which a three-year
term should be adequate. Application for per-
manent resident status would not be barred,
but a priori intent to return and a three-year
stay without extension would signal that per-
manent resident status should not be expected.
When the permanent admission system clears
foreign workers for employment in weeks not
years, a three-year period will be adequate for
those who do move to permanent status.
We urge Congress to move quickly to re-
structure both the temporary and permanent
employment-based visa systems. The forces that
have driven Congress to greatly increase the
number of H-1B visas are rooted in real eco-
nomic pressures, as well as failures in both per-
manent and temporary admission systems. Both
businesses and policymakers need to recog-
nize that the recent increases in the H-1B visa
ceiling will rapidly lead to crisis and bureau-
cratic gridlock as more and more H-1B holders
enter the queue for permanent visas. The ex-
isting system cannot handle the current num-
ber of immigrants attempting to adjust from
temporary to permanent status. Adding still
more applications will push the system towards
breakdown. The nation will be best served by
an expanded and streamlined permanent visa
system combined with a separate and flexible
temporary program.
Immigration reform is only one component
of a national workforce policy needed to meet
the challenges of tomorrow’s economy. Much
of the vigorous debate over H-1B visas has side-
stepped the fundamental problems that un-
derlie the nation’s shortages of skilled domestic
labor. CED’s more comprehensive recommen-
dations in American Workers and Economic Change
and other policy statements approach skills
building through public-private cooperation,
reform of educational institutions, and train-
ing.112
We recommend that a $1,000 training fee
(as currently assessed in the H-1B program) be
added to the user fees for permanent employ-
ment visas and transferred to a fund for the
education and training of native students and
workers. Such funds should be employed
through public-private partnerships and
voucher-type mechanisms that emphasize ef-
fective private training and student and worker
choice. In this regard, we look forward to ex-
pected evaluations of the current H-1B train-
ing fee program by the National Science
Foundation and Department of Labor.
CREATE MECHANISMS FOR
FLEXIBLE POLICIES
We strongly urge the creation of mecha-
nisms that will allow immigration policy to re-
spond flexibly to changing conditions.
Immigration policy should be reviewed at least
every three years and revised as necessary. Im-
migration is too important and complex to
permit policies to be formulated in a haphaz-
ard fashion and then to be locked in by  inflex-
ible regulation. Recent legislation exemplifies
the ad hoc responses that often conflict with
underlying principles and fail to make the sys-
tematic changes that resolve underlying ten-
sions. In spite of ongoing vigorous debate on
the level and composition of immigration, we
have no mechanism for routinely reviewing or
assessing policy. A mandatory three-year re-
view represents a minimal window for invoking
change.
A standing Advisory Board should be cre-
ated to inform Congress’ review of immigra-
tion policy and administration and to prompt
action as necessary. Congress and the Adminis-
tration would appoint the members of the
112. Committee for Economic Development (1994, 1996, 1998,
2001b).
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Board, whose role would be comparable to
that of the Social Security Advisory Board. It
would not issue policy recommendations, but
would provide projections and analysis useful
for the formulation and consideration of im-
migration policy. It would be required to issue
annual reviews of immigration and immigra-
tion policy covering a variety of topical issues.
The Board would also issue an action re-
port every three years directed at Congressional
reconsideration of immigration levels. The ac-
tion report would include an analysis of the
economic and social effects of immigration,
both current and prospective. It would provide
guidance to Congress on the appropriate level
and skill composition of immigration upon its
three-year review cycle.
We are concerned by the lack of credible
and consistent data and analyses of immigra-
tion and its effects, particularly those on the
labor market. What would be the impact of
different levels of immigration? What are the
nature and extent of labor market shortages?
Useful answers to these questions will come
only with routine and consistent research and
examination, directed and/or sponsored by
the federal government and reviewed by a single
advisory body. An independent body, with par-
ticipants from the private and government sec-
tors, could improve the quality of information
in this area, making greater use of macroeco-
nomic, labor market, and fiscal data from fed-
eral, state, and local sources.
Finally, we recommend that the Advisory
Board also consider international migration is-
sues and engage in discussions with other na-
tions regarding international rules and
regulations.  The United States should work
with other countries to harmonize rules re-
lated to international business travel and to
remove barriers and inefficiencies in this area.
For example, the Asia-Pacific Economic Coop-
eration forum (APEC) has played a leading
role in harmonization initiatives, and one of
its recommendations proposes visa-free travel
between member countries for business pur-
poses. Leading bodies such as the International
Organization for Migration are actively engaged
in developing internationally accepted policies
on a wide range of issues related to labor mar-
ket mobility. Just as an accepted body of poli-
cies written into trade accords governs the
global flow of goods and services, agreements
to govern international flows of labor may be-
come increasingly important. A standing advi-
sory body would prove very useful in evaluating
and responding to such initiatives.
CONCLUSION
As the impending long-term national labor
shortage approaches and the relative produc-
tivity and importance of skilled workers contin-
ues to grow, immigration will become
increasingly important as one means of ad-
dressing economic change. The successful ad-
aptation of our workforce to the requirements
of technological change and globalization in
the next several decades will be of profound
importance to American workers, business, and
the society at large. Successful adaptation will
bring stronger productivity growth, higher
wages, better living standards, and additional
resources to achieve our private and public
purposes. A failure to adapt will mean less
progress in all of these areas and a diminished
American role in the global economy.
This adaptation will require, first and fore-
most, improvements in the education and train-
ing of native workers, as CED has long argued.
Nevertheless, immigration has an important
supplementary role to play. Our current immi-
gration policies and their administration, how-
ever, have failed to produce an immigration
system that best serves the nation’s interests.
We believe the recommendations presented
here, taken together, offer a comprehensive
and integrated program for realizing the full
potential of immigration in building a produc-
tive workforce and prosperous nation.
39
Professionals with
Advanced Degrees
EB-2
(14,384)
Priority
Workers
EB-1
(21,408)
Immigrant Visas
(660,477)
Limited
Immigrants
(314,496)
Unlimited
Immigrants
(338,013)
Immediate
Relatives
(283,368)
Refugees and
Asylum-Seekers
(54,645)
Family-Sponsored
(191,480)
Diversity
and Other
(52,512)
Employment-Based
(77,517)
Unmarried
Children
of U.S. Citizens
(17,717)
Spouses and
Children of
Alien Residents
(88,488)
Married
Children
of U.S. Citizens
(22,257)
Siblings
of U.S. Citizens
(63,018)
Skilled, professionals,
unskilled
EB-3
(34,317)
Special
Immigrants
EB-4
(6,584)
Investors
EB-5
(824)SOURCE: Immigration and Naturalization Service.
1998 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. Washington, DC: November 2000.
APPENDIX A
 Legal Permanent Resident Classes of Admissions and Admissions in 1998
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APPENDIX B
Temporary Visa Categories and Issuances in 1997
Spouses and Children of
Temporary Workers and Trainees
H4, O3, P4, R2
(49,852)
Other Temporary Workers
H1-A, H2-A, H2-B, H3,O1,O2,
P1, P2, P3, Q1, R1
(72,031)
Temporary Visas
(5,516,210)
Nonwork Related
(1,674,766)
Work and Business Related
(3,841,423)
Temporary Visitors for Pleasure
B2
(1,020,402)
Temporary Visitors for Business
B1, B-1/B-2
(3,302,916)
Temporary Workers and Trainees
(152,578)
Speciality Occupations
H1-B
(80,547)
Students
F1, M1
(273,558)
Spouses and Children of Students
F2, M2
(22,383)
Transit Aliens or Crew
C1, C2, C3, C4, D
(231,344)
Foreign Officials and Families
A1, A2, A3
(79,291)
Representatives (and Families)
to International Organizations
G1, G2, G3, G4, G5
(29,221)
NATO Officials and Families
N1-7
(5,112)
Fiances(ees) and Children of
Fiances(ees)of U.S. Citizens
K1, K2
(13,455)
Exchange Visitors, and Spouses
and Children
J1, J2
(213,687)
Intercompany Transferees
and Family
L1, L2
(80,065)
Treaty Traders/Investors
and Families
E1, E2
(29,758)
Professional Workers
and Families, NAFTA
TN, TD
(511)
Representatives of Foreign Media
I
(12,056)
SOURCE: Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of
State. Report of the Visa Office 1997. Washington, DC: 1997.
This data, while representing a majority of issuances, only
include visas issued abroad.
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APPENDIX C
Organization Chart of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
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independent, nonpolitical research organizations in other countries. Such counter-
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tives similar to those of CED, which they pursue by similarly objective methods.
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common interest to the various countries concerned. This program has resulted
in a number of joint policy statements involving such international matters as
energy, East-West trade, assistance to developing countries, and the reduction
of nontariff barriers to trade.
